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Annex I Countries The industrialized countries (and 
those in transition to a market economy) which took on 
obligations to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions 
under the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change.
Black Carbon A form of air pollution produced by 
incomplete combustion of fuels. It is produced especially 
by diesel-powered vehicles, open biomas burning, 
cookstoves, and other sources.
‘Bottom up’ model A model which represents reality 
by aggregating characteristics of specific activities and 
processes, considering technological, engineering and cost 
information.
Business-As-Usual A scenario used for projections of 
future emissions assuming no action, or no new action, is 
taken to mitigate emissions.
Carbon Credits Tradable permits which aim to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions by giving them a monetary 
value.
Carbon Dioxide Equivalent A simple way to place 
emissions of various climate change agents on a common 
footing to account for their effect on climate. It describes, 
for a given mixture and amount of greenhouse gas, the 
amount of carbon dioxide that would have the same 
global warming ability, when measured over a specified 
timescale. For the purpose of this report, greenhouse gas 
emissions (unless otherwise specified) are the sum of the 
basket of greenhouse gases listed in Annex A of the Kyoto 
Protocol, expressed as carbon dioxide equivalent.
Conditional Pledge Pledges made by some countries that 
are contingent on the ability of national legislatures to 
enact the necessary laws, ambitious action from other 
countries, realization of finance and technical support, or 
other factors.
Double Counting In the context of this report, double 
counting refers to a situation in which the same emission 
reductions are counted towards meeting two countries’ 
pledges.
Emission Pathway  The trajectory of annual global 
greenhouse gas emissions over time.
Greenhouse Gases covered by the Kyoto Protocol  
Include the six main greenhouse gases, as listed in Annex 
A of the Kyoto Protocol, namely: Carbon dioxide (CO2); 
Methane (CH
4
); Nitrous oxide (N2O); Hydrofluorocarbons 
(HFCs); Perfluorocarbons (PFCs); and Sulphur hexafluoride 
(SF
6
).
Integrated Assessment Models models of climate change 
that seek to combine knowledge from multiple disciplines 
in the form of equations and/or algorithms. As such, 
they describe the full chain of climate change, including 
relevant linkages and feedbacks between socio-economic 
and biophysical processes.
Kyoto Protocol An international environmental treaty 
intended to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. It builds 
upon the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change.
Leakage Carbon leakage is defined as the increase in CO2 
emissions occuring outside of countries taking domestic 
mitigation action.
Lenient Rules Pledge cases with maximum Annex I 
“lenient LULUCF credits” and surplus emissions units. 
Likely Chance A greater than 66 per cent likelihood. 
Used in this report to convey the probabilities of meeting 
temperature limits.
Medium Chance A 50 to 66 per cent likelihood. Used 
in this report to convey the probabilities of meeting 
temperature limits.
Montreal Protocol A multilateral environmental 
agreement dealing with the depletion of the earth’s ozone 
layer.
Glossary and Acronyms
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BAU Business-As-Usual
CAEP Committee on Aviation Environmental Protection
CCS Carbon Capture and Storage
CDM Clean Development Mechanism
CFC Chlorofluorocarbons
CO
2
e Carbon Dioxide Equivalent
COP Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GHG Greenhouse Gas
Gt Gigatonne (1 billion metric tonnes) 
HFC Hydrofluorocarbon
IAM integrated Assessment model
ICAO  International Civil Aviation Organization
IEA International Energy Agency
IMO  International Maritime Organization
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
LULUCF Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry
NAMA Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
Acronyms
Non-Annex I Countries A group of developing countries 
that have signed and ratified the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change. They do not 
have binding emission reduction targets.
Pledge For the purpose of this report, pledges include 
Annex I targets and non-Annex I actions as included in 
Appendix I and Appendix II of the Copenhagen Accord.
Radiative Forcing Radiative Forcing (RF) is the global mean 
radiation imbalance over the long-term radiation ‘budget’ 
of the earth’s atmosphere from the pre-industrial period. 
A positive forcing warms the system, while a negative 
forcing cools it.
Scenario A description of how the future may unfold 
based on ‘if-then’ propositions. Scenarios typically include 
an initial socio-economic situation and a description of 
the key driving forces and future changes in emissions, 
temperature or other climate change-related variables.
Strict Rules Pledge cases in which the impact of “lenient 
LULUCF credits” and surplus emissions units are set to zero.
‘Top down’ model  A model which applies macroeconomic 
theory, econometric and optimization techniques to 
aggregate economic variables. Using historical data on 
consumption, prices, incomes, and factor costs, top-down 
models assess final demand for goods and services, and 
supply from main sectors, such as the energy sector, 
transportation, agriculture, and industry.
20th-80th percentile range Results that fall within the 20-
80 per cent range of the frequency distribution of results 
in this assessment.
Unconditional Pledges Pledges made by countries 
without conditions attached.
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Foreword
Nearly 20 years after governments established the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change and 14 years 
following the agreement of the Kyoto Protocol, nations 
gather in the South African coastal city of Durban to 
resume the crucial climate negotiations.
Keeping average global temperature rise below 2°C has 
become the focus of international efforts crystallized first 
in Copenhagen in 2009, and reaffirmed in Cancún last 
year.
This report outlines how far the current commitments 
and pledges of developed and developing nations can take 
the world in terms of achieving the 2°C limit or less, and 
the gap that remains between ambition and reality.
The analysis presented in “Bridging the Emissions Gap” 
has involved an unprecedented effort of climate modelling 
centres world-wide convened by the UN Environment 
Programme (UNEP).
Last year’s report - the first in this series - underlined 
that in order to have a likely chance of keeping within the 
2°C limit this century, emissions in 2020 should not be 
higher than 44 Gt of CO2 equivalent. 
 It suggested that if all the commitments and pledges 
were met in full, emissions would stand at around 49 Gt – 
a gap of 5 Gt needing to be bridged.
The analysis presented in this year’s report indicates 
that the gap has got larger rather than smaller, standing 
at around 6 Gt by around 2020. This is because new 
information has been included in the analysis.
Nevertheless, the report strikes an optimistic note by 
showing that greater leadership and ambition can bridge 
the gap and dramatically increase the chances of avoiding 
dangerous climate change.
Indeed, there is abundant evidence that emission 
reductions of between 14 to 20 Gt of CO2 equivalent are 
possible by 2020 and without any significant technical or 
financial breakthroughs needed.
This is confirmed by action across key sectors ranging 
from electricity production, industry and transport to 
buildings, forestry, agriculture and waste management. 
The aviation and shipping sectors also have a technical 
potential to contribute a further emissions reduction of 
about 0.3–0.5 Gt of CO2 equivalent in 2020.
Accelerated action on, for example, Hydroflurocarbons 
(HFCs) and air pollutants such as black carbon, also offer 
important complimentary options for combating climate 
change in the near term while delivering multiple, Green 
Economy benefits with respect to improved air quality and 
reduced crop damage.
the window for addressing climate change is rapidly 
narrowing but equally the options for cost effective action 
have never been more abundant.
This report speaks to an emissions gap that urgently 
needs addressing. In doing so, it also speaks to a political 
and leadership gap which Durban needs to assist in 
bridging.
Achim Steiner 
UN Under-Secretary-General,  
UNEP Executive Director
“There is abundant evidence that 
emission reductions of between 14 to 
20 Gt of CO2 equivalent are possible 
by 2020 and without any significant 
technical or financial breakthroughs 
needed”
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global climate policy has advanced on several fronts 
over the past few years and this report deals with two 
developments of particular importance  – The readiness 
of countries to pledge to new emission reductions, and 
the agreement among countries to an important global 
climate target. In December, 2009, countries were 
encouraged to submit pledges for reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions for the year 2020 as part of the Copenhagen 
Accord. Subsequently, 42 industrialized countries and 44 
developing countries submitted pledges. At the climate 
conference in Cancún one year later, parties formally 
recognised country pledges and decided “to hold the 
increase in global average temperature below 2°C above 
pre-industrial levels”. They also left open the option for 
“strengthening the long-term global goal on the basis of 
best available scientific knowledge including in relation to 
a global average temperature rise of 1.5°C”. An obvious 
and basic question is, to what extent will the country 
pledges help to meet the 2°C and 1.5°C targets?
A year ago, UNEP convened 25 scientific groups to 
assess this question. In their “Emissions Gap Report” 
released in December, 2010, the scientists reported that 
a gap was expected in 2020 between expected emissions 
and the global emissions consistent with the 2°C target, 
even if pledges were implemented fully. After receiving 
the report, policymakers requested UNEP to prepare a 
follow-up document which not only updates emission gap 
estimates, but more importantly, provided ideas on how 
to bridge the gap. This present report is a response to this 
request. To do the work UNEP has convened 55 scientists 
and experts from 28 scientific groups across 15 countries.
This report first reviews and summarizes the latest 
scientific studies of the gap. It then tackles the question – 
How can the gap be bridged? – by examining the question 
from different vantage points: From that of global 
integrated assessment models, from bottom-up studies 
of individual economic sectors, and from published work 
on the mitigation potential in international aviation and 
shipping emissions. These different perspectives provide 
a rich body of information on how to plausibly bridge the 
emissions gap in 2020 and beyond. 
1. Is it possible to bridge the emissions gap by 
2020?  
The answer to this question is, yes. Many different 
scientific groups have confirmed that it is feasible to 
bridge the emissions gap in 2020 between business-as-
usual emissions and emission levels in line with a 2°C 
target. 
The gap can be bridged by making realistic changes in 
the energy system, in particular, by further increasing its 
efficiency and accelerating the introduction of renewable 
energies (See point 3). 
From the viewpoint of different sectors of the economy, 
the gap can be bridged by pursuing a wide range of 
technically feasible measures to reduce emissions in 
different sectors (See point 3). 
Furthermore, policy instruments to realize these 
emission reductions have already been applied 
successfully in many countries and sectors. 
2. What is the emissions gap in 2020?
Although the country pledges help in reducing emissions 
to below a business-as-usual level in 2020, they are not 
adequate to reduce emissions to a level consistent with 
the 2°C target, and therefore lead to a gap. Estimates of 
this gap (6-11 GtCO
2
e) are larger than reported in the 
2010 UNEP Emissions Gap report (5-9 GtCO
2
e) but are 
still within the range of uncertainty of estimates. 
The size of the gap depends on the extent to which the 
pledges are implemented and how they are applied, what 
accounting rules are assigned, and the desired likelihood 
of staying below a particular temperature limit.
As a reference point, the gap would be about 12 GtCO2e 
(range: 9-18 GtCO2e) between business-as-usual emissions 
(i.e if no pledges are implemented) and emissions 
consistent with a “likely” chance (greater than 66 per 
Executive Summary 
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cent) of staying below the 2°C temperature target. This 
figure is nearly as large as current total greenhouse gas 
emissions from the world’s energy supply sector.
Four cases are considered which combine assumptions 
about pledges (unconditional or conditional) and rules 
for complying with pledges (lenient or strict). (For an 
explanation, see footnote1). 
Under Case 1 – “Unconditional pledges, lenient rules”, 
the gap would be reduced to about 11 GtCO2e (range: 
7-16 GtCO2e) or to a rounded value
2 of 2 GtCO2e below 
business-as-usual (earlier estimate = 9 GtCO2e).
Under Case 2 – “Unconditional pledges, strict rules”, 
the gap would be about 9 GtCO2e (range: 6-14 GtCO2e), 
or 3 GtCO2e below business-as-usual (earlier estimate = 8 
GtCO2e).
Under Case 3 – “Conditional pledges, lenient rules”, the 
gap would also be about 9 GtCO2e (range: 6-14 GtCO2e) 
or 3 GtCO2e below business-as-usual (earlier estimate = 7 
GtCO2e).
Under Case 4 – “Conditional pledges, strict rules”, 
the gap would be about 6 GtCO2e (range: 3-11 GtCO2e) 
(earlier estimate = 5 GtCO2e). This is 6 GtCO2e lower than 
business-as-usual conditions, and of the same magnitude 
as current total greenhouse gas emissions from the 
world’s entire transport sector. On the positive side, fully 
implementing the pledges halves the gap from business-
as-usual conditions;  in other words, brings emissions 50 
per cent of the way to the 2°C target.
The gap could still be 1-2 Gt CO2e larger if double 
counting of emissions reductions by developed and 
developing countries due to the use of the carbon market 
is not ruled out and if the additionality of CDM projects is 
not improved.
The estimate of the size of the gap has increased mostly 
because of two factors: 
(1) some developing countries have increased the baseline 
to which their pledges are connected, which reduces 
the effect of these pledges; 
(2) the Kyoto Protocol surplus emissions are estimated to 
be higher because of the economic recession, which 
reduces the effect of pledges in the “lenient rules” 
cases.
To stay within the 2°C limit, global emissions will have to 
peak soon
Emission pathways consistent with a “likely” chance 
of meeting the 2°C target have a peak before 20203, and 
have emission levels in 2020 around 44 GtCO2e (range: 41-
46 GtCO2e). Afterwards, global emissions steeply decline 
(an average of 2.6 % per year, with a range of 2.2-3.1 %)4, 
and/or reach negative emissions in the longer term. 
Accepting a “medium” (50-66 %) rather than “likely” 
chance of staying below the 2°C target relaxes the 
constraints slightly: emissions in 2020 could be 2 GtCO2e 
higher, and average rates of global reduction after 
2020 could be 2.5 per cent per year (range 2.2-2.9 %). 
Nevertheless, global emissions still need to peak before 
2020.
A 1.5°C target can also be met, but it won’t be easy
With regards to a 1.5°C target, the 2020 emission levels 
with a “likely” chance of staying within the 2°C limit 
are about the same as those with a “medium” or lower 
chance of meeting the 1.5°C target. However, to meet the 
1.5°C target the emission reduction rates after 2020 would 
have to be even faster than for a 2°C target.
To stay within the 2°C limit, global emissions in 2050 will 
have to be considerably lower than now 
As far as emissions in 2050 are concerned, to have a likely 
chance of complying with the 2°C target, total greenhouse 
gas emissions in 2050 must be about 46% lower than their 
1990 level, or about 53% lower than their 2005 level. 
3. How can the gap be bridged?
The gap can be narrowed by resolving some immediate 
climate negotiation issues. Possible actions to narrow 
the gap include:
• Implementing the more ambitious “conditional” 
pledges. This would reduce the gap by 2-3 GtCO2e 
• Minimizing the use of “lenient Land Use, Land Use 
Change and Forestry (LULUCF) credits” and surplus 
emission credits. This would reduce the gap by 2-3 
GtCO2e
• Avoiding the double-counting of offsets and improving 
the additionality of CDM projects. Double-counting 
could increase the gap by up to 2 GtCO2e.
1. In this report, an “unconditional” pledge is one made without conditions attached. A “conditional” pledge might depend on the ability of a national 
legislature to enact necessary laws, or may depend on action from other countries, the provision of finance, or technical support. “Strict” rules mean 
that allowances from LULUCF accounting and surplus emission credits will not be counted as part of a country meeting their emissions reduction 
pledges. Under “lenient” rules, these elements can be counted.
2. Two is computed by subtracting the unrounded numbers of Case 1 emissions (10.5, rounded to 11 in the text) from BAU emissions (12.4 rounded to 12 
in text). 12.4 – 10.5 = 1.9, which is rounded to 2 in text.
3. Global annual emissions consist of emissions of the “Kyoto basket of gases” coming from energy, industry and land use.
4. Throughout this report emission reduction rates are given for carbon dioxide emissions from energy and industry and expressed relative to 2000 
emission levels except when explicitly stated otherwise.
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Modelling studies show that it is feasible to bridge the 
gap: Global integrated assessment models indicate that 
it is possible, with technically and economically feasible 
measures, to bridge the emissions gap in 2020 between 
business-as-usual emissions and emissions consistent 
with the 2°C target. In particular, intervening in the 
energy system can be a successful strategy for reducing 
emissions. 
Nine different scientific groups have used global 
integrated assessment models to identify low emission 
pathways consistent with the 2°C target. Thirteen 
scenarios from these groups have been reviewed in this 
report. All of these scenarios reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions to the 2020 level consistent with a 2°C target, 
principally by modifying the energy system. Looking 
across these studies, they achieve low emissions in 2020 
by a combination of the following:
• Improving energy efficiency:  Primary energy 
production is up to 11% lower than business-as-usual 
levels in 2020 (with one study 18% lower). The amount 
of energy used per unit GDP decreases around 1.1 - 
2.3% per year from 2005 to 2020. 
• Producing up to 28% of total primary energy from 
non-fossil fuel energy sources in 2020. (As compared 
to 18.5% in 2005). 
• Producing up to 17% of total primary energy in 2020 
from biomass. (As compared to about 10.5% in 2005).
• Producing up to 9% of total primary energy in 2020 
with non-biomass renewable energy (solar, wind, 
hydroelectricity, other). (As compared to about 2.5% in 
2005). 
• Reducing non-CO2 emissions up to 19% relative to 
business-as-usual in 2020 (with one estimate of 2%).
It is important to note that the preceding numbers are 
maximum values for the different mitigation options, 
and that different mitigation scenarios had different 
mixes of these options. For example, different scenarios 
had varying percentages of biomass and non-biomass 
renewable energy. In fact, every scenario had a different 
mix indicating that there are many pathways to bridging 
the gap. 
Globally, the marginal costs of these packages of 
measures range from about US $25 to US $54 per ton of 
equivalent carbon dioxide removed, with a median value 
of US $38 per ton (with one estimate of US $15, and 
another of US $85). 
Detailed studies of different sectors also show that it 
is feasible to bridge the gap: A review of these studies 
confirms that pursuing a wide range of technically 
feasible measures can deliver more than enough 
emission reductions to fully close the gap between 
business-as-usual emissions and emissions in line with 
the 2°C target.  
Many ‘bottom-up’ studies have been carried out that 
articulate the potential to reduce emissions in various 
economic sectors. These studies differ from the analyses 
of global integrated assessment models by focusing on 
individual sectors. A review of these studies shows the 
following potential for reducing global emissions in 2020:
• The electricity production sector: 2.2 to 3.9 GtCO2e per 
year through more efficient power plants, introducing 
renewable energy sources, introducing carbon-
capture-and-storage, and fuel shifting.
• The industrial sector: 1.5 to 4.6 GtCO2e per year 
through improvements in energy efficiency, fuel 
switching, power recovery, materials efficiency 
improvements, and other measures.
• The transportation sector (excluding aviation and 
shipping): 1.4 to 2.0 GtCO2e per year through 
improvements in fuel efficiency, adoption of electric 
drive vehicles, shifting to public transit, and use of low 
carbon fuels. 
• The buildings sector:  1.4 to 2.9 GtCO2e per year 
through improvements in the efficiency of heating, 
cooling, lighting, and appliances, among other 
measures.
• The forestry sector: 1.3 to 4.2 GtCO2e per year through 
a reduction in deforestation, and changes in forest 
management that increase above and below ground 
carbon stocks. 
• The agriculture sector: 1.1 to 4.3 GtCO2e per 
year through changes in cropland and livestock 
management that reduce non-CO2 emissions and 
enhance soil carbon. 
• The waste sector: about 0.8 GtCO2e per year through 
improved wastewater treatment, waste gas recovery 
from landfills, and other measures. 
The total emission reduction potential of these sectors 
in 2020 adds up to about 16 ± 3 GtCO2e (the full range is 
16 ± 7 GtCO2e. The reduced range assumes that not all 
sectors are at the high end of their range simultaneously). 
Adding the aviation and shipping sectors sum up to a total 
emission reduction potential of 17 ± 3 GtCO2e (the full 
range is 17 ± 7).
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Marginal costs of reduction extend up to around 50 - 
100 US$/tCO2e.
One conclusion is that the 12 GtCO2e emissions gap in 
2020 (between business-as-usual emissions and emission 
levels in line with the 2°C target), can be bridged by 
realizing the mid-range estimate of the emission reduction 
potential. 
There is also potential to reduce international emissions 
from aviation and shipping 
Emissions from the aviation and shipping sectors are a 
special case compared with other sectors because a large 
fraction of global civil aviation and shipping emissions are 
“international” and not fully attributable to a particular 
country. International emissions have not been included in 
the Kyoto Protocol targets for Annex I countries and they 
do not fall under country pledges. Therefore, we take a 
separate look at potential emission reductions from these 
sectors.5
As of 2006, 62% of the emissions from aviation were 
international, and as of 2007, 83% from shipping were 
international. The 2005 emissions from global civil 
aviation were about 0.6 GtCO2 per year and about 1.0 
GtCO2 per year from global shipping. Together they 
account for about 5% of global CO2 emissions.  Business-
as-usual projections for 2020 are about 0.6 to 1.2 GtCO2 
per year from aviation and 1.1 to 1.3 GtCO2 per year from 
shipping.
Many studies have examined the potential for reducing 
emissions from these sectors. Options for reducing 
emissions from both sectors include improving fuel 
efficiency and using low-carbon fuels. For the shipping 
sector, another promising and simple option is to reduce 
ship speeds. 
Summed together, the two sectors are estimated to 
have a potential for reducing emissions in 2020 of about 
0.3 to 0.5 GtCO2e, which is additional to the potential 
of other sectors reported in bottom-up studies, leading 
together to a total of 17 ±3 GtCO2e.
Bridging the gap is possible in many ways 
To sum up, policymakers have many options for 
narrowing and closing the emissions gap in 2020. 
They can agree within the context of climate 
negotiations to implement their more ambitious 
“conditional” pledges, and in fulfilling these pledges they 
could minimize the use of “lenient LULUCF credits” and 
surplus emission credits. They could also agree to avoid 
the double-counting of offsets and make these offsets 
really additional. 
They could target their energy systems and make them 
more efficient in 2020 than they otherwise would be 
under “business-as-usual” conditions. Other goals would 
be to produce a larger share of their total primary energy 
from non-fossil fuel sources, with more primary energy 
from modern biomass and other sources of renewable 
energy in some combination. They could also reduce their 
non-CO2 emissions significantly.
By making energy use more efficient, and accelerating 
the use of renewable energy, they will be able to 
substantially reduce emissions coming from their 
electricity production, industrial, transportation, buildings, 
aviation and shipping sectors. But many other measures 
are also feasible for these sectors. 
Policymakers could also pursue better management 
as a strategy for reducing emissions from the forestry, 
agricultural and waste sectors. Reducing deforestation and 
improving forestry management would increase carbon 
stocks relative to a baseline, and changing farm and waste 
management practices would, in particular, be an effective 
strategy for reducing non-CO2 emissions. 
Based on the large body of scientific studies reviewed 
in this report, it is clear that no major technological 
breakthrough will be needed to substantially reduce 
emissions by 2020. A great potential already exists to 
reduce emissions, and costs of these reductions are not 
prohibitive. Indeed, a wide range of policy instruments 
for mitigating greenhouse gas emissions have already 
been adopted and are in use in many different sectors and 
countries throughout the world, and these instruments 
are successful in reducing emissions. 
And if the potential for reducing global emissions was 
to be realized, then the world would be on track to keep 
the rise in average global temperature to below 2.0 or 1.5 
degrees by 2020. It would still be possible to bridge the 
emissions gap in 2020 and stay on a pathway to long-term 
climate protection. 
5. Note: the potential emission reductions in the transportation sector noted in the previous section do not take into account aviation and shipping.
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Improving energy eﬃciency
Improving energy eﬃciency so that primary energy 
production is up to 11% lower than business-as-
usual levels in 2020 (with one study 18% lower). 
The amount of energy used per unit GDP decreases 
around 1.1 – 2.3% per year from 2005 to 2020.
Non fossil fuel energy sources
Producing up to 28% of total primary energy 
from non-fossil fuel energy sources in 2020. 
(As compared to 18.5% in 2005).
Energy from biomass
Producing up to 17% of total primary energy 
in 2020 from biomass. (As compared to about 
10.5% in 2005).
Renewable energy (solar, wind, hydro)
Producing up to 9% of total primary energy in 
2020 with non-biomass renewable energy (solar, 
wind, hydroelectricity, other). (As compared to 
about 2.5% in 2005). 
Reduce non-CO₂ emissions
Reducing non-CO₂ emissions up to 19% relative 
to business-as-usual in 2020 (with one estimate 
of 2%). 
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Case 1 – Unconditional pledges, lenient rules
If countries implement their lower-ambition pledges 
and are subject to “lenient” accounting rules, then 
the median estimate of annual GHG emissions in 
2020 is 55 GtCO₂e, within a range of 53 – 57GtCO₂e.
Case 2 – Unconditional pledges, strict rules 
This case occurs if countries keep to their lower-
ambition pledges, but are subject to “strict” accounting 
rules. In this case, the median estimate of emissions in 
2020 is 53 GtCO₂e, within a range of 52 – 55 GtCO₂e.
Case 3 – Conditional pledges, lenient rules 
Some countries will be more ambitious with their 
pledges. Where this is the case, but accounting 
rules are “lenient”, median estimates of emissions 
in 2020 are 53 GtCO₂e within a range of 52 – 55 
GtCO₂e. Note that this is higher than in Case 2.
Case 4 – Conditional pledges, strict rules 
If countries adopt higher-ambition pledges and are 
also subject to “strict” accounting rules, the median 
estimate of emissions in 2020 is 51 GtCO₂e, within a 
range of 49 – 52 GtCO₂e.
Please note: All emission values shown in the text are rounded to the nearest gigatonne.
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At Cancún in December, 2010, the international 
community took some important steps towards climate 
protection.  Countries agreed that “deep cuts in global 
greenhouse gas emissions are required … with a view …  
to hold the increase in global average temperature below 
2°C above pre-industrial levels”. They further agreed that 
“Parties should take urgent action to meet this long-term 
goal, consistent with science and on the basis of equity”. 
Moreover, they left open the option of “strengthening the 
long-term global goal on the basis of the best available 
scientific knowledge, including in relation to a global 
average temperature rise of 1.5°C” (UNFCCC, 2010a).
The 2°C and 1.5°C  targets had already been referred 
to a year earlier in the Copenhagen Accord of 2009 
(UNFCCC, 2009).  But in addition to incorporating 
temperature targets, the Accord also encouraged 
countries to submit “pledges”, i.e. proposals for emission 
reductions for the year 2020. Since Copenhagen, 42 
industrialized countries have submitted quantified 
economy-wide emission targets for 2020. In addition, 
44 developing countries submitted so-called Nationally 
Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) for inclusion in 
the Appendices to the 2009 Copenhagen Accord. These 
pledges have since become the basis for analysing the 
extent to which the global community is on track to meet 
long-term temperature goals. They were later ‘anchored’ 
in the 2010 Cancún Agreement (UNFCCC, 2010a, UNFCCC, 
2011a, UNFCCC, 2011b) in December 2010. 
With the international community agreeing to a 
temperature target on one hand, and to pledges for 
reducing emissions in 2020 on the other, it was not 
Chapter 1:
Introduction
surprising that many asked, “Are the pledges consistent 
with the temperature target?” and “How close will the 
pledges bring global emissions to the level consistent with 
the 2°C target?”
To tackle these questions, the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP), in collaboration with the 
European Climate Foundation and the National Institute 
of Ecology (Mexico), convened 25 scientific groups to 
compile an “Emissions Gap Report”. In their report, 
released in December, 2010, the scientists predicted a 
gap between emissions expected after the pledges were 
fulfilled and emission levels consistent with the 2°C target. 
After receiving the report, policymakers requested UNEP 
to prepare a follow-up document which not only updates 
emission gap estimates, but more importantly, provides 
ideas on how to bridge the gap. This present report is 
a response to this request. To do the work, UNEP has 
convened 55 scientists and experts from 28 scientific 
groups across 15 countries.
This report first reviews and summarizes the latest 
scientific studies of the gap. Many new studies are 
incorporated into the re-assessment of the gap. It then 
tackles the question – How can the gap be bridged? – by 
examining the question from different vantage points: 
From that of global integrated assessment models, 
from bottom-up studies of individual economic sectors, 
and from published work on the mitigation potential in 
international aviation and shipping emissions. Altogether, 
these different perspectives provide a wealth of 
information and insight into how the gap can be bridged 
in 2020, and how the world can get onto a pathway 
leading to long-term climate protection. 
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Chapter 2:
The Emissions Gap – an update
Lead authors: Niklas Höhne, Joeri Rogelj and Jiang Kejun
Contributing authors: Claudine Chen, Rob Dellink, Michel den 
Elzen, Claudio Gesteira, Kelly Levin, Jason Lowe, Emanuele 
Massetti, Tony Nyong, Elizabeth Sawin, Fabian Wagner, Zhao 
Xiusheng
2.1 The emissions gap: an update
This chapter provides an update to The Emissions 
Gap Report (UNEP, 2010) (see Box 1). The aim is to 
provide readers with the most current information 
about the size of the gap between expected emissions 
in 2020 according to country pledges and the emissions 
consistent with the 2°C target. As in The Emissions Gap 
Report, this chapter identifies future emission pathways 
that are consistent with a 2°C or 1.5°C temperature 
limit (section 2.2) followed by an analysis of expected 
global emissions in 2020 based on countries’ emission 
reduction pledges (section 2.3) and the resulting gap 
(section 2.4) in terms of annual global greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions. Emissions are measured in units of 
carbon dioxide equivalent for the gases covered by 
the Kyoto Protocol and reported under the UNFCCC 
(UNFCCC, 2002).6 
The data and information presented is based on an 
analysis of three kinds of information:
A. Emissions pathways
global emissions pathways analysed in this report are 
calculated by what are called Integrated Assessment 
Models (IAMs), and take into account population growth, 
economic growth, different patterns of energy use, land 
use, industrial production, etc. The Emissions Gap Report 
incorporated data from 17 IAMs. This update includes an 
additional three. Information from the same models is 
also used for the analysis in Chapter 3.
B. Projections of global temperature change
The global temperature change over time expected 
from these emissions pathways is worked out from what 
are called global climate models. Consistent with the 
approach for The Emissions Gap Report, this study uses a 
reduced complexity climate model ( Meinshausen et al., 
2011) which takes into account the uncertainties in the 
carbon cycle, climate and climate sensitivity. 
C. Analysis of pledges
Various approaches are used to assess global 
greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 assuming that 
countries fully implement their emission reduction 
pledges. This update includes the analysis from 13 
research groups, of which five updated their analysis 
since last year. Most groups analysed only the pledges 
themselves and did not attempt to quantify whether the 
national policies in place are sufficient to meet these 
pledges.
2.2 Scenarios consistent with temperature 
targets
2.2.1. Greenhouse gas emissions, concentrations and 
global temperatures in 2010
Total anthropogenic emissions at the end of 2009 were 
estimated at 49.5 GtCO2e (Montzka et al., 2011). These 
emissions include CO2 from fossil fuel use and from land 
use, as well as emissions of methane, nitrous oxide and 
other greenhouse gases covered by the Kyoto Protocol. 
Such a comprehensive estimate is not yet available for 
2010.
6. If not stated otherwise, all emissions in this report refer to GtCO2e (gigatonnes or billion tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent) – the global warming 
potential-weighted sum of the greenhouse gases covered by the Kyoto Protocol, that is CO
2, 
CH
4, 
N2O, HFCs, PFCs and SF6 , and include emissions from 
land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF).
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The 2009 Copenhagen Accord recognizes that deep cuts 
in global greenhouse gas emissions are required “so as to 
hold the increase in global temperatures below 2 degrees 
Celsius”. The Emissions Gap Report, published in December, 
2010, informed policymakers and the wider community on 
how far a response to climate change had progressed over 
the previous 12 months, giving an overview of results from 
the work of 10 different international scientific groups. 
Published by the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP), in conjunction with the European Climate 
Foundation and the National Institute of Ecology, Mexico, 
the report addressed five questions:
What 2020 emission levels are consistent with the 2°C 
and 1.5°C limits? 
The report found that if global emissions do not exceed 
44 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (ranging from 
39 to 44 GtCO2e) in 2020 and global emissions are rapidly 
reduced afterwards; then it is “likely” that global warming 
will be limited to 2°C. A “likely” chance has greater than 
66% probability.
What are the expected global emissions in 2020, if the 
pledges announced by countries are fulfilled? 
According to The Emissions Gap Report, if emissions 
pledges announced by countries are fulfilled, global 
emissions are expected to increase to between 49 GtCO2e 
according to the most ambitious pledges and measured 
under strict accounting rules; and 53 GtCO2e in 2020 
according to the least ambitious pledges and more lenient 
accounting rules. Business-as-usual (BAU) emissions in 
2020 are estimated to be 56 GtCO2e (ranging from 54 to 
60 GtCO2e). 
How big is the emissions gap?
The gap would range from 5-9 GtCO2e, depending 
on how the pledges were implemented and which 
accounting rules would be decided upon within the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
Double counting of international emissions offsets could 
increase the gap by up to 1.3 GtCO2e and there are no 
rules preventing this. As a reference point, if no pledges 
were acted on (i.e. BAU conditions), the gap would be 12 
GtCO2e.
What do the pledges suggest about future temperature 
changes? 
The Emissions Gap Report used emissions pathways 
from Integrated Assessment Models and calculated 
the expected temperatures from those pathways. 
Pathways that had the level of emissions expected from 
the Copenhagen Accord pledges in 2020 were found 
to imply a temperature increase of between 2.5 to 5°C 
before the end of the century. The lower bound was the 
case in which emissions are fairly stringently controlled 
after 2020, and the upper bound was the case in which 
emissions were more weakly or not controlled. 
How can the gap be minimized and what are the policy 
options to do so? 
The Emissions Gap Report found that countries can 
reduce the gap from 9 to 5 GtCO2e by adopting their 
higher ambition pledges (a gain of around 2-3 GtCO2e) 
and by the international community agreeing to the more 
stringent accounting rules for implementing the pledges 
(a gain of 1-2 GtCO2e). That said, a gap of 5 GtCO2e would 
still remain.
Box 1: The Emissions Gap Report 2010 in summary
Nevertheless, energy-related CO2 emissions in 2010 
were the highest on record, rising again after a dip in 2009. 
The dip is understood to have been caused by the global 
economic crisis (IEA, 2011). The year 2010 was also ranked 
as the highest or second highest for global near-surface 
temperatures, according to the three leading datasets of 
global near surface temperature7. However, it is important 
to emphasise that year-to-year variations in temperature 
are expected and it is the longer-term trend that provides a 
more reliable guide to global warming. Looking at decades 
as a whole and using information from the UK Met Office’s 
and the University of East-Anglia Climate Research Unit’s 
global temperature dataset (Brohan, 2006), the 2000’s 
were found to be the hottest decade in the instrument 
temperature record (see Figure 1).
The average concentration of carbon dioxide in the 
troposphere in 2010 was 388.5 ppm, estimated from 
globally averaged marine surface data. The average 
concentrations of methane and nitrous oxide measured 
at Mace Head in Ireland during the period October 
2009 to September 2010 were 1870 ppb and 323 ppb 
respectively. Measurements for these gases at Cape 
7. HadCRUT3 (http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/climatechange/science/monitoring/hadcrut3.html) covers the period 1850 to present and is updated 
monthly. NOAA NCDC (http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/cmb-faq/anomalies.php) covers the period from 1880. NASA GISS (http://data.giss.nasa.gov/
gistemp/) also covers the period from 1880.
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Figure 1: Decadal near-surface global average temperature anomaly, depicted relative to the temperature during the period 
1961-1990. Source: adapted from Menne & Kennedy, 2010
Grim in the Southern Hemisphere over the same period 
were 1748 ppb and 322 ppb. Together these produce a 
radiative forcing of around 2.4 W/m2. Additional radiative 
forcing of around 0.7 W/m2 is provided by a range of other 
greenhouse gases including tropospheric ozone, CFCs and 
HCFCs.8 Some of the forcing is offset by the cooling effect 
of short-lived atmospheric aerosol particles. 
The global mean equilibrium surface temperature 
increase above pre-industrial temperatures for greenhouse 
gas concentrations of 450 ppm CO2e is about 2.1°C (best 
guess). The radiative forcing of such a concentrations 
level is about 2.6 W/m2 (IPCC, 2007). Limiting long-term 
global temperature increase to below 2°C with a likely 
(greater than 66%) chance would imply greenhouse gas 
concentrations at equilibrium to be around 415 ppm CO2e 
(Rogelj et al., forthcoming). This corresponds to a net 
radiative forcing at equilibrium of about 2.1 W/m2. 
2.2.2 Combining socio-economic and climate-system 
modelling
Limiting global temperature increase to a given 
maximum level depends on the interplay between 
physical and socio-economic constraints. The cumulative 
emissions of long-lived greenhouse gases, such as carbon 
dioxide, are a proxy for the global temperature increase 
at timescales of decades to a century (Meinshausen et al., 
2009, Allen et al., 2009, Zickfeld et al., 2009, Matthews 
et al., 2009). While emission pathways (i.e. possible 
evolutions of annual global greenhouse gas emissions 
over time) can have similar cumulative emissions, they 
can be very different in terms of cost and feasibility. 
Integrated Assessment Models, which model aspects of 
the required technological and socio-economic transitions 
to achieve a specific emissions path, therefore provide 
important complementary information. In this report 
we look at emission pathways that sample a large range 
of possible future evolutions of the greenhouse gases 
covered by the Kyoto Protocol. The analysis does not 
explicitly look at policy options for short-lived species like 
black carbon that are not covered by the Kyoto Protocol. 
For the purpose of calculating temperature increase we 
apply one reduction scenario for these species to all 
emission pathways (see online appendix on methodology 
and Rogelj et al., 2011).
Integrated Assessment Models help in generating 
scenarios, i.e. consistent representations of plausible 
future development and emissions. Within these models, 
certain emission pathways are considered infeasible (i.e. 
not possible to achieve) because they contradict the 
assumptions about either how quickly new technologies 
can be scaled up, or existing technologies can be replaced, 
or the extent to which changes in behaviour can be 
induced. Scenarios may also be considered infeasible if 
the real-world ability to come to a political consensus on 
emission reductions and reduction mechanisms is missing. 
8. http://cdiac.ornl.gov/pns/current_ghg.html
18  UNEP BRidgiNg thE EmiSSioNS gAP – The Emissions Gap – an update
But this is typically not included in IAMs (Bosetti et al., 
2010, Ha-Duong and Treich, 2004). IAMs model feasible 
emission pathways over the entire twenty-first century. 
However, because of their prominence in international 
climate policy, we zoom in at the 2020 and 2050 emission 
ranges. 
The above factors of technological, economic, political 
and social feasibility are not governed by “hard laws”. 
As new evidence becomes available – in particular on 
the ability or inability to implement policies – the range 
of emission pathways considered feasible may change 
over time. For example, most emission pathways in the 
literature aim at attaining cost optimal paths over the 
entire twenty-first century. Also other trajectories are 
possible, for example with higher emissions in 2020 but 
a steeper decline afterwards, which would come with 
higher costs and are generally more difficult to implement 
technologically. Literature which exhaustively explores 
these aspects of near-term flexibility is in preparation 
and not considered in this report. On the other hand, 
as indicated above, consideration of political and social 
feasibility could also narrow the emission range in 2020 
required to be consistent with a 2°C trajectory. 
2.2.3  What emissions pathways and emission levels are 
consistent with 2°C and 1.5°C limits?
2020 emission levels in line with 2°C and 1.5°C 
Updated results from IAMs do not show fundamental 
differences with the figures presented for the year 2020 
in The Emissions Gap Report. This is despite the inclusion 
of 28 new scenarios, and the exclusion of 9 scenarios 
because their 2010 emissions were no longer consistent 
with historical estimates (see Table 1, Figure 2 and Figure 
3, and online appendix on methodology). 
As in The Emissions Gap Report, if global emissions do 
not exceed 44 GtCO2e in 2020 and emissions are sharply 
reduced afterwards; then it is “likely” that global warming 
can be limited to 2°C during the 21st century. A “likely” 
chance has greater than 66% probability. However, the 
range surrounding this global emissions value (44 GtCO2e) 
has changed in this update and is now 41 to 46 GtCO2e, 
compared with 39 to 44 GtCO2e in the Emissions gap 
Report. 
When accepting a “medium” chance (50 to 66 %) 
of achievement9, median total global greenhouse gas 
emissions in 2020 move to 46 GtCO2e (range 45 to 49 
GtCO2e). 
Since The Emissions Gap Report, no new pathways 
were found which can limit global warming to below 
1.5°C by the end of the century and no pathways were 
excluded. The assessment on this issue therefore remains 
unchanged: 2020 emissions consistent with a “medium” 
or lower chance of staying below 1.5°C being comparable 
to the earlier “likely” 2°C range of 2020 emissions (44 
GtCO2e with a range of 39 to 44 GtCO2e), but with 
significantly higher yearly reduction rates after 2020. 
2050 emission levels in line with 2°C and 1.5°C 
For global temperatures to have a “likely” chance to 
stay below 2°C, greenhouse gas emissions in 2050 should 
be lower than 21 GtCO2e (a range of 18 to 23 GtCO2e, see 
Table 1 and Figure 3). This is equivalent to an approximate 
emissions reduction of 45% relative to 1990 levels (range 
of 35 to 50%, rounded to the nearest 5%). If total global 
emissions in 2050 do not exceed 26 GtCO2e (range 24 to 
29 GtCO2e), then they are consistent with a “medium” 
chance (50 to 66%) that the global temperature increase 
can be kept below 2°C.
Global peaking, reduction rates and negative emissions
For both the ”likely”  and the “medium” chance 
pathways in our set, global emissions peak in the decade 
between 2010 and 2020 in the majority of cases (see 
Table 1). Median global average emission reduction rates 
between 2020 and 2050 are slightly higher in the “likely” 
pathways set (2.6%) than in the set with a “medium” 
chance to achieve the 2°C target (2.5%). 
The “likely” 2°C pathways in our set reach global net 
negative carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel and 
industry before the end of the century in more than 50% 
of the cases. This means that in these pathways, more 
carbon dioxide is removed from the atmosphere than 
is emitted into it. This scenario is possible by combining 
energy generation from biomass with the capture and 
storage of the carbon dioxide produced in this process 
(see also Chapter 3).
2.2.4 Discussion
In this update, there are 23 pathways having a “likely” 
chance to limit global temperature increases to below 
2°C. This compares with 9 pathways in The Emissions 
Gap Report. The additional information available about 
possible futures consistent with 2°C, changes the ranges 
only slightly (Tebaldi & Knutti, 2007). 
9. The definition of a “medium” likelihood is consistent with UNEP (2010). The IPCC guidance on uncertainty does not define such a category, but defines 
“about as likely as not” as 33 to 66% probability.
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Keeping emissions within a specific range in 2020 is not 
sufficient to assure that the world is following a global 
emission pathway which is consistent with 1.5 or 2°C. 
Global average temperature increase is mainly governed 
by emissions after 2020. Figure 2 and Figure 3 (left panel) 
show that pathways in which the 2020 emissions are 
consistent with a “likely” chance to achieve the 2°C target, 
could still lead to higher temperature increases by the end 
of the 21st century. This is because there are still multiple 
pathways that can be followed afterwards. In 2050 the 
ranges of emissions consistent with certain temperature 
limits overlap much less (see Figure 3, right panel). 
Table 1: Overview of key characteristics of pathways reviewed in this report with a “likely” (greater than 66 per cent) or a “medium” (50 to 
66 per cent) chance of limiting global temperature increase to below 2°C during the 21st century, respectively.
Since cumulative emissions determine the global 
temperature increase, pathways with emissions in 2020 
at the high end of the range in line with 2°C have to make 
up for that and are typically followed by 2050 emission 
levels at the lower end of the 2050 range (for example, 
46 GtCO2e for a “likely” chance in 2020 gives 18 GtCO2e in 
2050). 
Number of pathways
[-]
Peaking decade*
[year]
Total GHG emissions  
in 2020
[GtCO2e]
Total GHG emissions  
in 2050
[GtCO2e]
Average energy and industry 
related CO
2
 emission reduction 
rates between 2020 and 2050
[% of 2000 emissions/year]
median Range** median Range** median Range**
“Likely“ chance (>66%) to limit global temperature increase to below 2 °C during 21st century
23 2010-2020 44 26-(41-46)-49 21 12-(18-23)-32 2.6 0.6-(2.3-3.1)-3.6
“Medium“ chance (50 to 66%) to limit global temperature increase to below 2 °C during 21st century
17 2010-2020 46 42-(45-49)-50 26 20-(24-29)-32 2.5 2.0-(2.2-2.9)-3.6
* Because IAM pathways provide emissions data only for 5-year or 10-year increments, the encompassing period in which the peak in global emissions occurs is 
given. The peak year period given here reflects the 20th-80th percentile range. Note that pathways with a ”likely” chance show peaks earlier in the decade, whilst 
those with a ‘medium’ chance are spread across the whole decade. 
** Range is presented as the minimum value – (20th percentile – 80th percentile) – maximum value
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Figure 3 : Temperature increases associated with the different emissions pathways in the years 2020 (left) and 2050 (right): Thick, 
black lines show the median values, dark shaded areas represent the 20th to 80th percentile range, and light shaded ones the minimum 
maximum range. Note that the colour-coded legend can be found in Figure 2
Figure 2: Temperature increases associated with emission pathways as a function of the transient shapes of emission pathways: 
Coloured ranges show the 20 to 80 percentile ranges of the sets of IAM emission pathways that have approximately the same “likely” 
avoided temperature increase in the 21st century. Dashed lines show the median transient emission pathways for each temperature level, 
respectively. Figure includes the emissions in 2020 resulting from the pledges described in section 2.2.
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2.3 National emission reduction pledges and 
expected emissions in 2020: an update
Since November 2010, no country has changed its 
emission reductions pledge. Some countries, however, 
have clarified their assumptions and specified the 
methods by which they would like emissions accounted 
for. For example, Australia has provided its interpretation 
on how to account for its base year under the Kyoto 
Protocol and Brazil has provided a new estimate for its 
business-as-usual (BAU) emissions, to which its pledge 
is to be applied. These changes lead to higher global 
emissions totals (i.e. less reductions) for the cases that 
assume pledges are met. 
global emissions in 2020 will depend on pledges 
implemented and the rules on how these pledges will be 
accounted for. 
An “unconditional” pledge is one made without 
conditions attached. A conditional pledge on the other 
hand might depend on the ability of a national legislature to 
enact necessary laws, or may depend on action from other 
countries, the provision of finance, or technical support.
International rules on how emission reductions are to 
be measured after the first commitment period of the 
Kyoto Protocol have not yet been defined. Rules for Annex 
I countries exist under the Kyoto Protocol until 2012. Rules 
for developing countries are not available. The Emissions 
Gap Report and this update describes four cases of 
expected emissions in 2020, based on whether pledges 
are conditional, or not; and whether accounting rules are 
strict or more lenient (see Box 2 and Table 2). 
2.3.1 Four “cases” of expected emissions in 2020
Case 1 – “Unconditional pledges, lenient rules”: 
If countries implement their lower-ambition pledges 
and are subject to “lenient” accounting rules, then the 
median estimate of annual GHG emissions in 2020 is 55 Gt 
CO2e, within a range of 53-57 GtCO2e.
 
Case 2 – “Unconditional pledges, strict rules”: 
This case occurs if countries keep to their lower-
ambition pledges, but are subject to “strict” accounting 
rules. In this case, the median estimate of emissions in 
2020 is 53 GtCO2e, within a range of 52-55 GtCO2e.
Case 3 – “Conditional pledges, lenient rules”: 
Some countries will be more ambitious with their 
pledges. Where this is the case, but accounting rules are 
“lenient”, median estimates of emissions in 2020 are 53 
GtCO2e within a range of 52-55 GtCO2e
Case 4 – “Conditional pledges, strict rules”: 
If countries adopt higher-ambition pledges and are also 
subject to “strict” accounting rules, the median estimate 
Climate change negotiations have yet to agree to 
rules that account for two elements that can influence 
the amount of allowed greenhouse gas emissions. First, 
rules have not been agreed to account for emissions 
from land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF). 
Secondly, rules have not been agreed for using surplus 
emissions credits, which will occur when countries 
exceed their emissions reduction targets.
The Emissions Gap Report and this update define 
“strict” rules to mean that allowances from LULUCF 
accounting and surplus emission credits will not be 
counted as part of a countries meeting their emissions 
reduction pledges. Under “lenient” rules, these 
elements can be counted.
Box 2: Defining “strict” rules and “lenient” 
rules
of emissions in 2020 is 51 GtCO2e, within a range of 49-52 
GtCO2e.
As a reference point, without the Copenhagen pledges, 
global greenhouse gas emissions may increase from 45 
GtCO2e in 2005 to 50 GtCO2e in 2009 to around 56 GtCO2e 
in 2020 (within a range of 55-59 GtCO2e) according to BAU 
projections.
Note also that the impact of “lenient” or “strict” rules 
on the resulting emissions in 2020 is potentially very 
sizeable. In fact, we find that the “lenient” use of LULUCF 
credits and surplus emission units could completely cancel 
out the impact of the Annex I pledges in the unconditional 
case, and significantly reduce their impact in the 
conditional case. Whilst we have deliberately assumed a 
maximum possible impact of these two issues in the two 
“lenient” pledge cases, it is important to note this finding, 
as the rules surrounding these two issues may be finalised 
over the course of 2012.  
It is also important to note that the gap could 
be significantly larger, if emission reductions in 
developing countries that are supported by developed 
countries through offsets, for example, using the Clean 
Development Mechanism, are counted towards meeting 
both countries’ pledges (see use of offsets below).
2.3.2 Land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF):
an update
Countries still have to agree on accounting rules that 
will determine the extent to which LULUCF activities in 
Annex I countries could be used to meet their respective 
targets for the period after 2012. In principle, LULUCF 
22  UNEP BRidgiNg thE EmiSSioNS gAP – The Emissions Gap – an update
accounting systems need to accurately and consistently 
describe changes in emissions or removals of carbon 
dioxide and other greenhouse gases attributed to human 
activity only. There are at present no consistent and 
reliable models that can isolate changes in emissions 
not related to human activities. Current proposals for 
accounting rules therefore use recent historical levels 
to set reference levels from which to assess changes in 
activities.
Many options for accounting rules are being considered 
in the climate negotiations. The aggregate impact of 
these options for Annex I countries is variable. It could 
result in pledged emissions going down by 0.2 GtCO2e; or 
increasing by 0.6 GtCO2e
10 (Primap, 2010). This represents 
a shift in the estimate since the 2010 report and is mainly 
due to changes in updated LULUCF data provided by 
countries. In this update we use a value of 0.6 GtCO2e 
increase for the “lenient” case, 0.2 GtCO2e lower than in 
The Emissions Gap Report.
Some of the latest submissions of countries on their 
reference levels for forest management11 are substantially 
Table 2: Emissions in 2020 assuming countries implement their pledges
Historical emissions 
GtCO
2
e
Emissions in 2020 
GtCO
2
e
1990 2005 BAU Unconditional pledge Conditional pledge
Lenient 
rules 
(case 1)
Strict rules 
(case 2)
Lenient 
rules 
(case 3)
Strict 
rules 
(case 4)
global 
(incl. 
LULUCF)
Number of 
modelling 
groups
5 10 10 10 10 10 10
Maximum 37.8 45.0 62.2 60.2 56.7 55.0 52.7
80th percentile 37.7 45.0 59.1 56.7 55.3 54.8 51.8
median 37.7 45.0 56.4 54.5 53.0 53.3 50.1
20th percentile 36.9 45.0 54.8 52.8 51.6 51.7 48.6
Minimum 33.7 45.0 52.8 51.4 49.7 49.2 45.2
The range in 1990 emissions stems from the use of different data sources and assumptions especially for non-Annex I countries. In order to ensure a consistent 
comparison of the pathways and pledges we have harmonized the data for the same 2005 emissions of 45 GtCO2e. A recent estimate of 2009 emissions is 49.5 GtCO2e, 
but that was not used by the modeling groups. 
different from reported levels of this activity over the 
past 10 years (2000-2009).  These reference levels are in 
effect a BAU scenario. Such a scenario translates to a net 
emissions increase of 0.7 GtCO2e relative to the annual 
average over 2000-200912. Thus, the adoption of these 
reference levels implies either the endorsement of higher 
emissions in this sector, or, if removals continue along the 
historical trend (i.e. lower than the reference levels), a 
larger number of credits. 
2.3.3 Updating surplus emissions
Some countries will exceed their emissions reduction 
targets under the first commitment period of the 
Kyoto Protocol, and may even continue to reduce their 
emissions beyond their 2020 target, either through policy 
action or for reasons unrelated to climate change policy. 
Where this is the case, they can carry-over, or bank 
these “surplus emission units” for use in the following 
commitment period. Surplus emissions can be sold or 
used domestically to meet future mitigation commitments 
up to 2020. If this happens, then estimates of 2020 
10. Two groups have provided quantification of LULUCF accounting, the Joint Research Centre (JRC), and the PRIMAP group at the Potsdam Institute for 
Climate Impact Research (PIK-PRIMAP). JRC estimates a range of 0.16 GtCO2e/yr in debits to 0.48 GtCO2e/yr in credits calculated over the period 2013-
2020, for four options for forest management, most in the current negotiation text (These options are the current Kyoto Protocol cap, a discount factor 
of 85%, reference levels, and net-net compared to the first commitment period). Their estimate for the year 2020 is a range of 0.21 GtCO2e in debits to 
0.42 GtCO2e in credits. PIK-PRIMAP estimates a range of 0.02 to 0.6 GtCO2e in credits, for these same options over the period 2013-2020.
11. Based on a decision in Cancún, Parties provided in early 2011 their preferred forest management reference levels for the period 2013-2020. These 
reference levels underwent an expert review process that was completed in October 2011. Some Parties have resubmitted their forest management 
reference levels. Most countries chose a forwarded projected reference level, while three other countries chose different options: Japan – current Kyoto 
rules, Norway, Russian Federation, Ukraine and Belarus – net-net accounting against 1990. See:  http://unfccc.int/meetings/ad_hoc_working_groups/
kp/items/5896.php 
12. http://www.climateactiontracker.org/CAT_update_Bonn_2011-06-16.pdf
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emissions increase, because these surplus emission 
units can be used to comply with the pledges, instead of 
domestic emission reductions. 
The total emissions surplus by 2012, at the end of the 
first commitment period, is estimated to be 11.4 GtCO2e 
(range 9 to 13 GtCO2e) (PointCarbon, 2009, Bosetti et 
al., 2010, den Elzen et al., 2010, World Bank, 2011). We 
translate this into an annual supply of surplus emission 
units of 2.9 GtCO2e in the year 2020, by assuming the 11.4 
GtCO2e are used increasingly over time between 2012 
and 2020, with a maximum in 2020. The use distribution 
would look like a wedge, i.e. an increasing linear 
distribution (see Rogelj et al., 2010a, Rogelj et al., 2010b). 
This 2.9 GtCO2e is used in the “lenient rules” cases and 
replaces the 1.3 GtCO2e used in The Emissions Gap 
Report, which was based on an even distribution over the 
period. A large share of the surplus allowances originates 
from Russia. If Russia does not use their allowances 
domestically for the 2020 target and does not sign on 
for a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol 
(therefore, being unable to sell such allowances), then the 
supply of surplus emissions would be reduced from 2.9 to 
1.5 GtCO2e.
The impact of surpluses strongly depends on whether 
countries will buy such surpluses. Currently, the largest 
potential buyer, the USA, does not have a federal law that 
would allow buying such units, but may have state-level 
laws. Canada has aligned its position with the USA. The 
EU also does not allow surplus allowances to be used to 
comply with its unconditional pledge to reduce emissions 
by 20% before 2020. Japan has bought such allowances 
in the past but has so far not made a clear statement 
for its 2020 pledge. Hence, the net impact of use of 
surplus allowances could be substantially lower than the 
projected 2.9 GtCO2e in 2020. In the UNFCCC negotiations, 
options to limit the carry-over of surplus allowances are 
being discussed.
2.3.4 The use of offsets potentially widens the gap
A further issue still to be resolved is the potential to 
double count emissions reductions. Some developed 
countries, for example, will achieve their emissions 
reduction targets in part by purchasing carbon credits 
from developing countries. Developing countries 
meanwhile will achieve their pledge in part by enacting 
measures resulting in the sale of carbon credits to 
developed countries. The four pledge cases in The 
Emissions Gap report and in this update do not assess 
the impact of such double counting but in the absence of 
international rules it is likely that both sets of countries 
will want to claim credits for what is essentially the same 
project or activity. 
If we simply assume that international emissions offsets 
could account for 33% of the difference between Annex 
I BAU and pledged emission levels by 2020; and if we 
assume that all of these are counted twice, then global 
emissions would be 1.3 GtCO2e higher (in the “conditional 
pledge, strict rules” case). A recent study (Erickson et al., 
2011) estimates a figure of 1.6 GtCO2e using assumptions 
on demand and supply of offsets. 
The four pledge cases also do not account for the risk 
that more offset credits are generated than are actually 
reduced. Project activities need to be “additional” to 
an expected development without the project. Such 
comparison with a hypothetical case is difficult and there 
is indeed evidence that a significant share of CDM projects 
is not additional (Haya, 2009). Assuming this share to be 
25% by 2020, we estimate that up to 0.4 GtCO2e of offsets 
could be non-additional. 
The use of offsets (double counting and non-
additionality) could lead to an increase of emission levels 
by up to 2 GtCO2e.
13
2.3.5 Leakage effects potentially widen the gap
Most of the models used in this update do not assess 
“leakage effects” (Burniaux and Oliveira-Martins, 2000). 
Leakage effects are actions to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions in one country that lead to an increase in 
emissions elsewhere.  
The models implicitly assume that the emissions of 
countries without a pledge will follow a BAU pathway. 
However, this may not be the case. Several studies 
published in 2011 indicate that emissions in countries 
without a pledge may be higher because of the impact 
of emission reductions in developed countries. But they 
also show that leakage rates vary widely.  One study for 
example estimates a leakage rate of 13%  or 0.55 GtCO2e 
(Peterson et al., 2011); another 16% (Bollen et al., 2011)14. 
At the lower end is an assessment of around 1%, or 0.05 
GtCO2e (Dellink et al., 2011) and comparable numbers 
computed by McKibbin et al. (2011). 
13. The combined potential effect of double counting and non-additionality can be smaller than the sum of the two individual potential effects, because 
two different accounting systems can be used for the offsets and for the pledges. If a project does not result in additional reductions, it could be the 
case that these reductions are not counted towards meeting the country’s pledge because the accounting for the pledge is done at the national level, 
e.g. with national energy statistics.
14. Bollen et al. (2011) find that the targets for China and India are not binding and assume no targets for other non-Annex I countries, and hence have only 
mitigation in the Annex I region. The 16% is thus with respect to Annex I emission reductions.
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Analyses of countries pledges reviewed in this update 
were carried out by a number of modelling groups around 
the world. They are: the AVOID programme of the UK 
Met Office (Lowe et al., 2010); Climate Action Tracker 
by Ecofys, Climate Analytics and Potsdam Institute for 
Climate Impact Research, PIK (updated based on Climate 
Action Tracker, 2009, Rogelj et al., 2010b, Rogelj et al., 
2010a), Climate Interactive (C-ROADS), (Sterman et al., 
undated),  Climate Strategies (Climate Strategies, 2010), 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) (Carraro & Massetti, 
forthcoming), IIASA with the GAINS model (Wagner & 
Amann, 2009), Grantham Research Institute, London 
School of Economics (updated based on Stern & Taylor, 
2010), OECD (Dellink et al., 2011), PBL Netherlands 
Environmental Assessment Agency (den Elzen et al., 2011) 
Peterson Institute for International Economics (Houser, 
2010), Project Catalyst by the Climate Works Foundation 
(ProjectCatalyst, 2010), UNEP Risoe centre,  
(http://www.unep.org/climatepledges/), World resources 
Institute (Levin & Bradley, 2010)  (for details see online 
appendix and Höhne et al., 2011).
Estimating 2020 emissions, based on countries’ pledges 
or submissions to the Copenhagen Accord and Cancún 
Agreements involves among others: information on the 
historical, current and future development of countries’ 
emissions; interpretation of the pledges in the cases 
in which countries have submitted a range of pledges; 
assumptions on the precise meaning of those pledges 
where countries have not been specific including the exact 
accounting rules; and uncertainties in the underlying data 
used by modelling groups. This is why the 13 modelling 
groups that have prepared such analyses do not all arrive 
at the same results.
Since the publication of The Emissions Gap Report, 
five of the thirteen groups have updated their results. 
The results for all other groups submitted in 2010 remain 
unchanged in this update. Of the 13 groups only 10 were 
used to assess the global total, because the remaining 
three had limited geographical coverage. 
Figure 4 provides an estimation of the emissions gap 
in 2020 for the unconditional, strict rules (case 4) as 
analysed in 2010 and 2011 based on the data from the 
different modelling groups.
Box 3. Why different modelling groups arrive at different results 
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Figure 4 : Estimation of the emissions gap in 2020 (GtCO2e) for the conditional, strict rules case (case 4) as analysed in 
2010 and 2011 based on the data from different modelling groups
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2.3.6 Additional action and climate financing – 
potentially decreases the gap
In some developing countries existing domestic policies 
or national plans could lead to emissions that are even 
lower than the conditional pledges submitted under 
the Copenhagen Accord and the Cancún Agreements – 
by up to 2 GtCO2e in total (e.g. den Elzen et al., 2011). 
Present discussions on international climate finance 
may in addition result in further emissions reductions in 
developing countries. One study estimates an effect of up 
to 2.5 GtCO2e (Carraro & Massetti, 2011). All these issues 
have been analysed and found to have a significant effect 
on 2020 emissions. However, they are not included in any 
of the pledge cases.
2.3.7 Aggregated results for Annex I and Non-Annex I 
countries
For Annex I countries, in the least ambitious case 
(“unconditional pledges, lenient rules”), emissions are 
estimated to be equivalent to BAU emissions in 2020, 
i.e. 4% below to 11% above 1990 levels. In the most 
ambitious case, Annex I emissions in 2020 are expected to 
be 16-18% below 1990 levels. For non-Annex I countries, 
in the less ambitious cases emissions are estimated to 
be 6-7% lower than BAU emissions, in the ambitious 
cases 8-9 per cent lower than BAU. This implies that the 
aggregate Annex I countries’ emission goals – even in the 
most ambitious scenario – are less ambitious than the 25-
40% reduction by 2020 (compared with 1990) suggested 
in the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (Gupta et al., 2007). 
Similarly, the non-Annex I countries’ goals are, collectively, 
less ambitious than the 15-30% deviation from BAU which 
is also commonly used as a benchmark (den Elzen & 
Höhne, 2008, den Elzen & Höhne, 2010). 
2.4 The emissions gap
This chapter aims to see whether, since The Emissions 
Gap Report’s publication in December, 2010, there have 
been any changes to the “gap” between projected global 
emissions in 2020 and the level of emissions consistent 
with keeping the global temperature rise to no more than 
2°C relative to pre-industrial levels. 
As a reference point, BAU emissions in 2020 will be 56 
GtCO2e – a figure unchanged from The Emissions Gap 
Report within a range of 55 to 59. The required level of 
emissions that would most “likely” constrain the rise in global 
temperatures to 2°C is 44 GtCO2e within a range of 41 to 46. 
The gap under BAU would therefore be 12 GtCO2e.
Under the four different interpretations of how the 
pledges would be followed (section 2.3), the emissions 
gap is 6 to 11 GtCO2e within a full range of 3 to 16 GtCO2e 
(Figure 5). This compares with an emissions gap of 5 to 9 
GtCO2e within a full range of 3 to 18 in The Emissions Gap 
Report.
Figure 5 summarises the gaps that result from four 
different interpretations of how the pledges are followed, 
and for a “likely” (greater than 66 %) and a “medium” (50-
66 %) chance of staying below 2°C.
Some elements that are not included in the four cases 
do have the potential to further increase or decrease the 
gap. Double counting of offsets could increase the gap 
by 1.6 GtCO2e. The non-additionality of offsets could also 
increase the gap by 0.4 GtCO2e. Countries not meeting 
their pledges as assumed in all studies could further 
increase the gap. Given the absence of international rules 
on these issues and the strong interest of many developed 
countries to continue using offsets, such increases are 
rather likely. Elements that are not included in this gap 
calculation that could decrease the gap are additional 
effects of international climate financing or countries 
over-achieving their pledges.
Since the Emissions Gap Report, the gap has increased 
by 1 to 2 GtCO2e across all cases. However, the increase 
in the size of the gap is still smaller than the uncertainty 
range between different models. 
2.4.1 Why has the gap increased?
There are a number of reasons why the gap has increased:
• Countries have not changed their pledges to reduce 
emissions, but some countries clarified their pledges 
and published BAU emissions, which increased the 
assessment of the emission level allowed under the 
pledges for some studies. 
• Half of the modelling groups considered have changed 
their underlying BAU scenarios for greenhouse gas 
emissions, some effectively increasing it, and therefore 
increasing the gap. Two modelling groups (PBL and 
Grantham) now use generally higher assumptions on 
BAU economic and emission growth, in particular in 
developing countries. In their assessment, the gap 
has widened by about 2-4 GtCO2e. The emissions gap 
calculated by a third group (Climate Action Tracker) 
has remained relatively high, but decreased compared 
to The Emissions Gap Report. This is because Climate 
Action Tracker’s analysis already included high BAU 
assumptions. In this update, it has lowered BAU for 
some countries, but increased BAU assumptions 
for China and Brazil. One group decreased the 
gap (Climate Interactive), because it adjusted the 
underlying BAU. One new group was included (OECD) 
that has a gap larger than the median. The analysis 
here uses the updated and the unchanged studies. 
Projections of future emissions remain uncertain, 
especially in these economically unstable times.
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Figure 5. The emissions gap for a “medium” and “likely” chance of meeting 2°C
2.4.2 Immediate policy options to narrow the gap
Policies exist to help bridge the gap, though in terms 
of the time available there is now one less year to do 
so. Moreover, the available options are also fewer. For 
example, nine scenarios considered to be feasible to 
bridge the gap in the Emissions gap report are no longer 
feasible as they assume changes in the year 2010 that are 
inconsistent with the observed development. 
Immediate policy options to narrow the gap related to 
the pledges include:15 
• Implement (the more ambitious) conditional 
pledges: The gap would be reduced by about 2 to 3 
GtCO2e. This would require that conditions pledges be 
fulfilled. These conditions include expected actions of 
other countries as well as the provision of adequate 
financing, technology transfer and capacity building. 
15. The effects of individual elements overlap. Therefore, the values stated in the paragraphs are not additive.
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Alternatively, it would imply that conditions for some 
countries are relaxed or removed. 
• Minimise the use of ‘lenient LULUCF credits’ and 
surplus emission units: If industrialized countries 
apply strict accounting rules to minimise the use of 
‘lenient LULUCF credits’ and avoid the use of surplus 
emissions units for meeting their targets, they would 
strengthen the effect of their pledges and thus reduce 
the emissions gap in 2020 by about 2 to 3 GtCO2e (with 
up to 0.6 GtCO2e coming from LULUCF accounting and 
up to 3.0 GtCO2e from surplus emissions units). 
• Avoid the double counting of offsets: Double counting 
of offsets could lead to an increase of the gap by 
up to 1.6 GtCO2e, depending on whether countries 
implement their unconditional or conditional pledges 
(there is likely to be a greater demand for offsets in 
the higher-ambition, conditional case). Hence avoiding 
double counting could be an important policy option. 
The way to realise this would be an international 
decision that offset reductions can only be counted 
once. Financing countries could make financing of 
emission reductions transparent and specify whether 
emission reductions will count towards their own 
target. 
• Ensuring strict additionality of offsets: Reform of the 
current international offset mechanism, the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) is under discussion. 
If this reform can tighten the additionality of certified 
reductions, this could save up to 0.4 GtCO2e.
• Implement measures that go beyond current pledges 
and/or strengthen pledges: The mitigation scenarios 
indicate that it is technically possible and economically 
feasible to reduce emissions beyond present national 
plans in 2020 (see also chapter 3). As an example, 
if Annex I countries would reduce their emissions 
by 25% below 1990 in 2020, it would decrease the 
gap by an additional 1.6 GtCO2e beyond the strict 
conditional case. At 40% below 1990 it would be 4.5 
GtCO2e. Some national or regional emission scenario 
studies for developed and developing countries 
show the possibility of reducing emissions further 
than the pledges if more policies and actions were 
implemented.
Findings of the UNEP report on short-lived GHG species 
(UNEP, 2011), such as black carbon and tropospheric 
ozone, have shown that mitigation of such short-lived 
species can complement although not replace mitigation 
of long-lived GHG species, such as carbon dioxide. Deep 
and immediate carbon dioxide reductions are required 
to protect long-term climate. However, reducing short-
lived climate forcers now would slow down the rate 
of temperature change, which is very important for 
minimizing short-term climate impacts and avoiding 
climate thresholds. 
The assessment described in the sections above 
quantifies the gap between pathways in line with 2°C 
and the pledges of countries under the UNFCCC, taking 
into account all Kyoto GHGs. Methane is at the same 
time part of this basket and highlighted in UNEP (2011) 
as a mitigation option to reduce concentrations of 
tropospheric ozone. Policies targeting emission reductions 
of methane can therefore often be accounted towards 
the 2020 pledges of countries. Both UNEP (2011) and this 
study affirm that such enhanced mitigation of methane is 
beneficial for long-term climate goals as long as it is not 
used to replace mitigation of CO2 and other long-lived 
GHGs.
Emission pathways consistent with a 2°C or 1.5°C 
temperature limit are characterized by rapid rates of 
emission reduction post-2020. Such high reduction 
rates on a sustained time-scale will be challenging and 
unprecedented historically. Therefore, it is critical to 
lay the groundwork now for faster post-2020 emission 
reductions, for example, by avoiding lock-in of high-carbon 
infrastructure with a long lifespan, or by developing and 
demonstrating advanced clean technologies (see also 
chapter 3).
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Vuuren 
3.1 Introduction  
Chapter 2 updated the Emissions Gap Report (UNEP, 
2010) and compared projections of global emissions of 
greenhouse gases under four different sets of pledge 
assumptions with emissions consistent with 2°C and 
1.5°C targets. It was found that the gap in 2020 would 
be between 6 and 11 GtCO2e under different pledge 
assumptions, and 12 GtCO2e assuming business as usual 
conditions under which no pledges are acted on. 
This chapter explores how to bridge the gap, and takes 
two approaches to do so:
(1) Results from Global Assessment Models. the 
first approach is to review selected emission scenarios 
computed by global assessment models (see section 
3.2). The scenarios reviewed have in common that they 
all comply with the goal of staying below a 2°C increase 
over the 21st century (the “2°C target”). This set of 
scenarios overlaps with those reviewed in Chapter 2.  The 
scenarios are generated by first setting a climate target 
(usually a carbon dioxide stabilization goal) and then 
using the models to compute a “least cost package” of 
emission mitigation measures that comply with the target. 
Since the scenarios stay within the 2°C target, they also 
bridge the gap between BAU emissions in 2020 and the 
emissions in line with the 2°C target. Hence the package 
of mitigation measures identified in the scenarios can be 
viewed as successful examples of how to close the gap. In 
this chapter we will refer to these scenarios as “mitigation 
scenarios”.
Chapter 3:
How to bridge the gap - what the 
scenarios and studies say
(2) Sectoral Studies. the second approach is to review 
detailed studies of emission reduction potentials in 
various economic sectors up to a certain marginal cost 
level (see section 3.3). When added up, these estimates 
give an indication of the total potential for reducing 
global emissions in 2020. The total potential can then be 
compared to the 2020 gap to determine whether or not 
the gap can be bridged. In this chapter we refer to these 
figures as “estimates from sectoral studies”. 
3.2 Results from global mitigation scenarios
This section describes potential reductions in 
greenhouse gas emissions based on scenarios compatible 
with the 2°C target. It addresses two key questions:
1.  What are the packages of mitigation measures that can 
bridge the gap in 2020 between BAU and emissions 
consistent with the 2°C target? 
2.  How do estimates compare across models?
Nine different modelling groups have identified 
technically-feasible measures to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions in line with the 2°C target. Thirteen scenarios 
from these nine groups are reviewed in this section (see 
Table 3). Scenarios used in this chapter overlap with 
those in Chapter 2, but are not exactly the same.16 in this 
chapter we analyze both mitigation scenarios and the 
BAU scenarios upon which they are based. The mitigation 
scenarios identify packages of mitigation measures that 
lead to emissions consistent with the 2°C target.  Below, 
we identify these mitigation measures for 2020. The 
measures can be summarized as (1) improved energy 
efficiency, as indicated by reduced primary energy use 
and decreasing energy intensity, (2) a low-emission 
energy mix, and (3) reduction of non-CO2 greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
16.  Both chapters use only scenarios that comply with the 2°C target. Chapter 2 uses only scenarios that cover all greenhouse gases, whereas Chapter 
3 also considers scenarios with only CO2 emissions. Chapter 3 uses only results that are available with sectoral detail. A further difference is that all 
scenarios in Chapter 2 were harmonised with the same emissions in 2005, while this was not done in Chapter 3. This is why some of the mitigation 
scenarios in Chapter 3 have emissions above the 80th percentile range given in Chapter 2.
How to bridge the gap - what the scenarios and studies say – UNEP BRidgiNg thE EmiSSioNS gAP  29 
A
nn
ua
l 
ec
on
om
ic
 
gr
ow
th
 ra
te
 
fr
om
 2
00
5 
to
 2
02
0 
(%
)
g
lo
ba
l 
pr
im
ar
y 
en
er
gy
 
co
ns
um
pti
on
 
in
 2
02
0 
(E
J)
Re
du
cti
on
 
in
 p
ri
m
ar
y 
en
er
gy
 
be
lo
w
 
“c
ur
re
nt
 
po
lic
y”
 
or
 B
aU
 
sc
en
ar
io
 
(%
)
Sh
ar
e 
of
 g
lo
ba
l p
ri
m
ar
y 
en
er
gy
 c
on
su
m
pti
on
 b
y 
di
ff
er
en
t 
te
ch
no
lo
gi
es
 in
 
20
20
 (%
)
Re
du
cti
on
 
in
 n
on
-C
O
2 
em
is
si
on
s 
be
lo
w
 
“c
ur
re
nt
 
po
lic
y”
 
or
 B
aU
 
sc
en
ar
io
 
(%
)
m
ar
gi
na
l 
ab
at
em
en
t 
co
st
 (U
S$
/
tC
O
2e
)
CO
2 e
m
is
si
on
s 
fr
om
 
fo
ss
il 
fu
el
s 
an
d 
in
du
st
ry
 
in
 2
02
0 
(G
tC
O
2e
)
Em
is
si
on
s 
of
 a
ll 
gr
ee
nh
ou
se
 g
as
es
 
co
ve
re
d 
by
 th
e 
Ky
ot
o 
Pr
ot
oc
ol
 in
 2
02
0 
(G
tC
O
2e
)
Bi
om
as
s 
w
it
ho
ut
 
CC
S
Bi
om
as
s 
w
ith
 
CC
S
N
on
-b
io
m
as
s 
re
ne
w
ab
le
s 
(w
in
d,
 s
ol
ar
, 
hy
dr
o,
 
ge
ot
he
rm
al
)
Fo
ss
il 
w
it
ho
ut
 
CC
S
Fo
ss
il 
 
w
ith
 
CC
S
N
uc
le
ar
 
Em
is
si
on
s
Re
du
cti
on
 
be
lo
w
 
BA
U
Em
is
si
on
s
Re
du
cti
on
 
be
lo
w
 
BA
U
A
IM
-E
nd
us
e 
1)
2.
60
%
50
8 
7.
9%
11
.7
%
0.
0%
5.
3%
76
.6
%
0.
0%
6.
3%
9.
6%
85
 
29
 
 6
42
 
9 
d
N
E2
12
)
2.
81
%
59
6 
8.
0%
9.
0%
0.
0%
2.
4%
82
.0
%
0.
0%
6.
7%
17
.3
%
25
 
35
 
 6
44
 
9 
G
CA
M
3)
2.
42
%
58
4 
7.
2%
14
.5
%
0.
2%
3.
0%
76
.1
%
0.
2%
6.
0%
18
.9
%
28
 
33
 
 6
45
 
12
 
im
Ag
E4
)
3.
12
%
56
6 
6.
4%
9.
6%
0.
0%
3.
4%
79
.9
%
0.
5%
6.
6%
1.
8%
42
 
34
 
 4
49
 
4 
m
ES
SA
g
E5
)
2.
59
%
53
9 
9.
5%
10
.2
%
0.
0%
5.
5%
76
.9
%
0.
7%
6.
7%
10
.1
%
30
 
31
 
 8
47
 
10
 
RE
m
iN
d
6)
3.
40
%
56
3 
17
.8
%
8.
6%
3.
6%
4.
7%
72
.9
%
3.
0%
7.
3%
19
.1
%
54
 
29
 
 1
6
39
 
25
 
G
EA
-S
up
pl
y7
)
2.
59
%
54
8 
8.
1%
10
.2
%
0.
0%
5.
8%
75
.0
%
1.
2%
7.
7%
15
.5
%
45
 
31
 
 9
48
 
13
 
G
EA
-M
ix
7)
2.
59
%
53
1 
8.
4%
9.
9%
0.
0%
5.
7%
76
.5
%
0.
8%
7.
1%
15
.0
%
34
 
31
 
 8
48
 
11
 
G
EA
-E
ffi
ci
en
cy
7)
2.
59
%
49
6 
5.
5%
7.
4%
0.
0%
5.
1%
80
.9
%
0.
0%
6.
7%
12
.2
%
14
 
31
 
 4
48
 
6 
En
er
gy
 [r
]e
vo
lu
ti
on
8)
3.
30
%
52
5 
10
.0
%
13
.4
%
0.
0%
7.
8%
75
.1
%
0.
0%
3.
8%
-
-
27
 
 6
-
-
A
dv
an
ce
d 
en
er
gy
 [r
]
ev
ol
uti
on
8)
3.
30
%
51
6 
11
.4
%
13
.7
%
0.
0%
9.
4%
73
.1
%
0.
0%
3.
8%
-
-
25
 
 8
-
-
IE
A
 W
EO
 2
01
09
)
3.
60
%
59
2 
5.
1%
10
.9
%
0.
0%
5.
0%
77
.0
%
0.
0%
7.
1%
-
45
 
32
 
 4
-
-
th
e 
En
er
gy
 R
ep
or
t1
0)
3.
10
%
49
5 
9.
0%
17
.0
%
0.
0%
7.
0%
72
.0
%
0.
0%
4.
0%
-
-
- 
 -
-
-
Re
su
lt
s 
of
 A
si
a 
M
od
el
lin
g 
Ex
er
ci
se
: 1
: A
ka
sh
i e
t 
al
. (
fo
rt
hc
om
in
g)
, 2
: W
ad
a 
et
 a
l. 
(f
or
th
co
m
in
g)
, 3
: E
om
 e
t 
al
. (
fo
rt
hc
om
in
g)
,  
4:
 v
an
 R
ui
jv
en
 e
t 
al
. (
fo
rt
hc
om
in
g)
,  
5:
  v
an
 V
lie
t 
et
 a
l. 
(f
or
th
co
m
in
g)
, 6
: L
ud
er
er
 
et
 a
l. 
(f
or
th
co
m
in
g)
, 7
: R
ia
hi
 e
t 
al
. (
20
11
)
Sc
en
ar
io
s 
th
at
 c
on
si
de
r 
on
ly
 e
ne
rg
y 
an
d 
in
du
st
ry
 r
el
at
ed
 e
m
is
si
on
s:
 8
: K
re
w
itt
, e
t 
al
. (
20
10
),
 9
: I
EA
 (2
01
0b
),
 1
0:
 D
en
g 
et
 a
l. 
(2
01
0)
 
Ta
bl
e 
3.
 C
ha
ng
es
 t
o 
ec
on
om
ic
 a
nd
 e
ne
rg
y 
in
di
ce
s 
ne
ed
ed
 t
o 
cl
os
e 
th
e 
gl
ob
al
 e
m
is
si
on
s 
ga
p 
in
 2
02
0.
 
30  UNEP BRidgiNg thE EmiSSioNS gAP – How to bridge the gap - what the scenarios and studies say
3.2.1 Closing the emissions gap (I):  emissions and costs 
Table 3 describes 13 emission scenarios that comply 
with the 2°C target and close the gap between BAU 
emissions and the 2°C target in 2020. Four scenarios only 
cover energy-related CO2 emissions. Each of the scenarios 
has a slightly different figure for economic growth 
between 2005 and 2020 and a different figure for primary 
energy consumption in 2020.
The lowest estimate of emissions from fossil fuels and 
industry is 25 GtCO2e (Krewitt et al., 2010). The highest is 
35 GtCO2 (Wada, et al., forthcoming). This compares to a 
BAU scenario of emissions from fossil fuels and industry of 
33 to 46 GtCO2
17. 
For scenarios with all greenhouse gases covered by 
the Kyoto Protocol, emissions are between 39 and 48 
GtCO2e in 2020 compared to a BAU of 52 to 64 GtCO2e. 
Altogether, the scenarios in Table 3 achieve the 2°C target 
with emissions 4 to 25 GtCO2e lower than BAU conditions 
in 2020, equivalent to 9-13% below BAU (with one 
estimate, 25% below). 
The cost of the packages of measures ranges from 25 
US$/tCO2e to 54 US$/tCO2e (with one estimate of 14 US$/
tCO2e and another of 85 US$/tCO2e), with a median value 
of 38 US$/tCO2e. 
The scenario with the lowest carbon price (GEA-
Efficiency, Riahi et al., 2011) assumes extreme changes 
to the world’s energy mix, including significant 
breakthroughs in energy efficiency, motivated by efforts to 
decrease air pollution and to improve energy security. It 
also assumes a very low BAU emissions scenario. 
The mitigation scenario with the highest carbon price 
(Akashi et al., forthcoming) assumes the application of 
costly innovative technologies which pushes up the price 
of carbon reductions. 
Figure 6 shows the greenhouse gas emissions for BAU 
and mitigation cases for the scenarios of Table 3, for 
which all greenhouse gases were available18. The coloured 
ranges are the 20th-80th percentile ranges from Chapter 
2. It can be seen that the mitigation scenarios in Chapter 
2 are collectively somewhat higher than the range of 
scenarios from this Chapter 3. This would mean that the 
gap between BAU emissions and the 2°C target in 2020 
would be somewhat smaller for the set of scenarios in this 
Chapter than in Chapter 2. 
3.2.2 Closing the emissions gap (II): improving energy 
efficiency 
Improving energy efficiency, or likewise decreasing 
energy use, is of course an effective way to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions (assuming other factors remain 
17.  Excluding the Energy Report (Deng et al., 2010)
18. Other scenarios only cover energy-related CO2 emissions.
constant). One indicator of improving energy efficiency 
is comparing total primary energy use in the mitigation 
scenarios to a BAU case. In 2020, primary energy use in 
the mitigation scenarios was 5 -11% lower than in the BAU 
case, except for one scenario which had 18% lower energy 
use. These lower levels of energy use were achieved 
mostly through energy-saving technologies. 
Another indicator of improving energy efficiency is a 
decrease in energy intensity of the economy over time. 
For the different mitigation scenarios, energy use per 
unit GDP decreased from 1.1 to 2.3% per year19 between 
2005 to 2020. Meanwhile, the CO2 intensity of energy 
(emissions of CO2 per unit energy) decreased in many 
scenarios up to 1.0% per year. Faster decreases in CO2 
intensity are expected after 2020 due to the accelerated 
introduction of renewable energy and CCS.
Figure 7 shows energy efficiency results for 2020 for 
three different sectors. It is clear from this figure that 
the models used to generate the scenarios make very 
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Figure 6. Global greenhouse gas emissions from the BAU and 
mitigation scenarios with corresponding marginal abatement 
costs in 2020 for models that considered all greenhouse gases
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different assumptions about which sector can most 
economically reduce energy use. All mitigation scenarios 
assume a substantial reduction of energy in the industrial 
sector. For the different mitigation scenarios, the 
reduction of energy use relative to the BAU case is 4% to 
10% in the industrial sector, 0.3 % to 10% in the buildings 
sector, and 1% to 11% in the transportation sector.  
3.2.3 Closing the emissions gap (III): lower-emission 
energy mixes 
The energy mix also has a major influence on the 
magnitude of emissions. In general, emissions are 
assumed to drop when fossil fuel energy sources are 
replaced by non-fossil fuel sources (biomass, non-biomass 
renewables and nuclear). Emissions also decrease under 
certain kinds of fuel shifting, especially from coal to gas. 
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Figure 7. Reduction potential of final energy by sector below BAU in 2020 (REMIND and GEA are not included, as such data were not 
available)
For the set of mitigation scenarios, the share of total 
primary energy from non-fossil fuel energy sources ranged 
between 18 to 28% in 2020. This is somewhat larger 
than the 2005 share of around 17 to 20%19. All scenarios 
indicate an increase in energy from renewables between 
2005 and 2020, though the range is quite wide, from 2 EJ 
to 52 EJ. 
the share of total primary energy from biomass in 
2020 ranges from 7 to 17%, compared with 9 to 12% in 
2005. The reduced use of biomass in the short-term in the 
GEA-efficiency scenario is due to the successful adoption 
of energy access policies and the resulting substitution 
of traditional biomass by modern and clean fuels in the 
developing world.  
The share of non-biomass renewables, such as wind, 
solar and hydropower, ranges from 2 to 9% of total 
primary energy in 2020 as compared to 2 to 3% in 
19. The figure for 2005 is taken from results from the Asia Modelling Exercise and GEA. The base year for “Energy [r]evolution” is 2007 and for “WEO 2010” 
it is 2008. The energy intensity of Energy [r]evolution, Advanced Energy [r]evolution and WEO 2010 scenarios are 2.6%, 2.7% and 2.3% respectively.
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2005. All scenarios indicate an increase in non-biomass 
renewables from the base year. Nine scenarios whose 
base year is 2005 indicate increases ranging from 3 to 
21 EJ between 2005 and 2020. The DNE21 mitigation 
scenario computes the lowest share of non-biomass 
renewables (2%) in part, because it achieves lower 
emissions through a large shift from coal to gas.
All 13 scenarios are expecting a shift away from “coal 
without carbon capture and storage (CCS)” to other 
energy sources, resulting in an average reduction of coal 
use from 24 EJ to 115 EJ below BAU in 2020 (Figure 8). 
Some scenarios (REMIND and GCAM) compute that a 
small amount of energy will be provided by “coal with 
CCS” in 2020. Energy provided by oil is computed to fall by 
1 EJ to 35 EJ below BAU in 2020. Some models compute 
an increase in energy from gas, and others a decrease 
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compared to BAU. The scenarios also differ in their views 
of the future contribution of nuclear energy, ranging from 
a decrease of 14 EJ to an increase of 10 EJ over BAU. One 
scenario expects a contribution in 2020 of 20 EJ from 
“biomass with CCS”, and another a contribution of 26 EJ 
by non-biomass renewables.  
3.2.4 Closing the emissions gap (IV): reducing non-CO
2
 
greenhouse gas emissions 
Greenhouse gases other than carbon dioxide, such 
as methane and nitrous oxide and fluorinated gases, 
(commonly referred to as “non-CO2” gases) make up 
about one-quarter of current total greenhouse gas 
emissions (US EPA, 2011), and are also expected to make a 
significant contribution to future emissions. Although the 
sources of non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions vary widely, 
the models used to compute the scenarios make very 
Figure 8. Change of primary energy consumption below BAU in 2020 from scenarios included in Table 3
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simple assumptions about mitigation measures for these 
gases, typically assigning a single removal rate to the 
entire set of non-CO2 greenhouse gases. For the mitigation 
scenarios, non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions were 9.6 to 
19.1% lower than the BAU scenarios, with one scenario 
having 1.8% lower emissions. 
3.3 Options and emission reduction potentials 
by sector
This section explores the contribution of individual sectors 
to bridging the emissions gap. The analysis is based on 
analytical work on a sectoral level and includes:
• The main emission reduction options
• Total size of emission reductions achievable by 2020,  
 compared to a BAU scenario. 
The definition of achievable emission reduction 
potential varies between the sectoral studies. 
Achievable here means that the emission reductions are 
technologically possible, and that certain constraints, e.g. 
the rate of stock turnover, is taken into account. Most 
of the studies take into account cost cut-offs, typically 
between 50 and 100 US$/tCO2e, either explicitly or 
implicitly. And it is assumed that the potential can be 
realized if the political willingness is there.
3.3.1 The electricity production sector
The major emissions reduction options for the electricity 
sector can be categorized as follows: 
• Fuel shifting, mainly from coal to gas
• More energy from renewable sources (hydropower, 
onshore and offshore wind, solar photovoltaic (PV), 
concentrating solar power, geothermal, wave and tidal 
power)
• Nuclear energy 
• Carbon capture and storage (CCS) 
• More efficient fossil power plants 
In addition, the more efficient use of electricity can 
contribute to reducing emissions from the power sector. 
This will not be dealt with here, but within the sectors 
that use energy.
Fuel shifting
There are no accurate estimates of the emission 
reduction potential from changing between fossil fuels 
(known as fuel shifting). However, it can be said that 
most of the shift is likely to be from coal to natural gas. 
The World Energy Outlook (IEA, 2010b) estimates that 
coal-based power generation will increase by 42% by 
2020 in the Current Policies scenario. If all these power 
plants would be built to use natural gas, it would lead to 
an emission reduction of 1.9 GtCO2e in 2020 over BAU 
in the absence of any other reduction option. However, 
other emission reduction options could be implemented 
in parallel, which is why we estimate that greenhouse 
emissions savings from fuel shifting will be less, and in the 
order of 0.5 - 1.0 GtCO2e. 
Renewable energy sources
Renewable energy for power generation has grown 
rapidly over the past decade (REN21, 2011). This is 
because, over the past 30 years, technologies have 
steadily improved, costs are coming down, and 
government policies in this area have expanded (Arent 
et al., 2011). The quantity of wind-powered electricity 
production has grown by 27% per year from 2005 to 
2010, and the production of photovoltaic electricity has 
grown by 49% per year in the same period (REN21, 2011). 
The share of hydropower in global electricity production 
is now 16% and from “new” renewable sources 3.3% 
(REN21, 2011). 
The IPCC special report on renewable energy sources 
(IPCC 2011) presents four scenarios with the contribution 
of renewable energy sources to global electricity 
production, ranging from 21 to 38% in 2020. Other 
recently published scenarios suggest that the contribution 
of renewable energy sources to electricity production 
in 2020 could be 32% (Deng et al., 2011) or 33 to 38% 
(Krewitt et al., 2010). The highest estimates would lead 
to an extra electricity production of 4000 TWh. This could 
result in an emission reduction potential of 1.5 – 2.5 
GtCO2e.
20
Nuclear
The electricity production with nuclear power has 
remained stable over the past several years, amounting 
to 13% of global electricity production in 2011. In its 2010 
World Energy Outlook, the International Energy Agency 
projects the contribution of energy from nuclear power 
in 2020 as between 12.5% to 14.5% of the global total 
electricity production (IEA, 2010b). This represents an 
increase in production of between 35-40% between 2008 
and 2020. 
A recent study showed limited progress (Deutch et 
al., 2009). Another study, taking into account recent 
slow speed of nuclear construction in comparison to 
announcements, suggest that nuclear capacity worldwide 
will decline (Deutsch et al., 2009). To our knowledge, no 
analysis has yet been performed on the global impact of 
the Fukushima incident on the development of nuclear 
20. Assuming that the realizable potential is between 60 and 100%, and that fossil-fuel based power generation is avoided with an average emission factor 
of 610 g/kWh
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power. Given these uncertainties we do not specify a 
reduction potential for nuclear power. 
CCS
The application of CCS is currently mostly confined 
to demonstration projects. Currently, 14 projects are 
operational or under construction: together they 
are expected to capture 0.03 GtCO2e per year upon 
completion. An additional 74 projects are in preparation 
or being planned (Global CCS Institute, 2011). If all were 
realized and were, on the average, the same size as 
the current demonstration projects, this would lead to 
a capture of nearly 0.2 Gt. Net avoided emissions are 
somewhat less, because the capture process reduces 
energy efficiency. On the basis of a strong introduction 
scenario defined by Hendriks (2007), an avoided CO2 
emission of 0.4 Gt in 2020 can be calculated. We take 
an emission reduction potential of 0.2 – 0.4 GtCO2e 
(technical potential) in 2020 for CCS in the power sector, 
which is more optimistic than most of the scenarios given 
in section 3.2. 
More efficient fossil power plants
No estimates were available on the global mitigation 
potential from improving the energy efficiency of fossil 
power plants.
Emission reduction potential 
Based on the above, the total emission reduction 
potential derived for the electricity production sector is 
between 2.2 and 3.9 GtCO2e.
3.3.2 Options in the industry sector
Greenhouse gas emissions from industry are dominated 
by two main sources: the first of these is greenhouse 
gas emissions from the direct use of fossil fuels (e.g. 
energy intensive industry such as iron and steel, pulp and 
paper, as well as cement); the second is the indirect use 
of fossil fuels via electricity consumption (air-handling, 
compressed air, space conditioning and lighting). Smaller 
sources of greenhouse gas emissions in industry include 
‘non-energy’ uses of fossil fuels, such as the use of fossil 
fuels as feedstocks in chemicals processing; as well as 
emissions from industrial processes such as the use of 
calcium carbonate in cement manufacturing. Industry also 
emits different non-CO2 greenhouse gases. 
Emission reduction options
Due to the diversity of production processes and energy 
end-uses, there are numerous mitigation options for the 
industrial sector. Some options are generic and sector wide 
(e.g. improvements in electric motor driven systems) and 
some are specific to a certain production process (e.g. for 
iron and steel or cement). Greenhouse gas emissions can be 
reduced by:
• Improvements in energy efficiency
• Fuel switching to energy sources with lower emissions 
(natural gas, biomass, low carbon electricity, 
geothermal/solar heat, etc.)
• Power recovery through co-generation, pressure 
recovery turbines, gasification, etc. 
• Materials efficiency, waste minimization, recycling 
and recovery to eliminate energy intensive primary 
extraction and conversion steps
• Product change and substitution
• CO2 sequestration
More fundamental technical changes will be needed in 
the long term after 2020, when energy efficiency and fuel 
switching are exhausted. Such long-term technical options 
include new types of cements/concretes, geo/solar 
thermal heat, and hydrogen from renewable sources for 
reducing iron ore or for producing nitrogen fertilisers. 
Emission reduction potential 
The potential for reducing emissions and associated 
costs from industry by 2020 or later is difficult to estimate 
because of the diversity and complexity of the industrial 
sector. Scenario analyses provide an indication of the 
quantity of greenhouse gases that could be saved in the 
industrial sector. The IPCC, for example, has calculated 
that between 3 and 6.3 GtCO2e per year could be saved 
by 2030 under one scenario; and that under another 
scenario, between 2 and 5.1 GtCO2e per year at a cost 
of less than US$100/tCO2e (IPCC, 2007a). “Bottom-up” 
analyses are generally based on what is called “best 
practice” or “best available technology” as well as 
assumptions about possible penetration rates in different 
time frames (IPCC, 2007a, Deng et al., 2010). No recent 
bottom-up estimates are available, but the significant 
savings potentials of the above mentioned scenarios are 
confirmed, e.g. (UNIDO, 2010). 
The total emission reduction potential derived for the 
industry sector is between 1.5 and 4.6 GtCO2e in 2020, 
assuming that 60 – 80% of the above mentioned potential 
for 2030 can be realized by 2020. Taking into account that 
a substantial part of the potential for 2030 consists of 
retrofitting, this suggests that substantially more than half 
of the 2030 potential can be realized by 2020.
 3.3.3 Options in the transportation sector 
Emission reduction options
Options to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the 
transport sector include improvements in vehicle fuel 
efficiency, early adoption of electric drive vehicles, 
development of low carbon fuels, massive modal shift to 
public transit and freight rail, and activity reduction. 
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Technology options to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
from on-road vehicles basically involve making them more 
energy efficient, and reducing the carbon intensity of 
their fuels. Conventional wisdom holds that consumers 
and transport operators would demand fuel-efficient 
equipment to reduce transportation costs. In reality, in the 
absence of fuel efficiency or greenhouse gas regulations, 
the uptake of efficiency technologies in fleet-wide fuel 
economy has varied significantly from market to market 
and has depended largely on fuel pricing (including 
subsidies on fuels) and income growth. While efficiency 
has improved in the past, it has been in some cases offset 
by higher vehicle performance, additional features, size, 
and weight, see e.g. Lutsey (2010). 
To date, the most extensive efforts to limit the increase 
in transportation emissions have been via improvements 
in the fuel efficiency of cars (light-duty on-road vehicles). 
Recently approved vehicle fuel efficiency standards in the 
US, EU, and China – already accounted for in the base case 
– will reduce emissions by about 0.3 GtCO2e in 2020 (ICCT, 
forthcoming). Much greater effort, however, is needed to 
bridge the emissions gap by 2020. 
If there are no additional emission reduction policies 
globally, then transportation emissions are projected to 
increase to about 11 GtCO2e in 2020 (ICCT, forthcoming).
21 
Although developed countries will be responsible for 
about half of the global emissions by 2020, about 80% 
of the growth in transport emissions between now and 
2020 will take place in developing countries. Passenger 
cars, heavy-duty trucks, and aviation will be responsible 
for about 70% of this growth (ICCT, forthcoming). Without 
strong measures these trends will not be reversed. 
Emission reduction potential 
According to a preliminary analysis by the International 
Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT), the potential 
to reduce emissions from the transportation sector 
(excluding aviation and shipping, see Chapter 4) by 2020 
is about 1.7 GtCO2e. The majority of this reduction could 
come from technology options, including expanded 
use of biofuels and improved vehicle efficiency (ICCT, 
forthcoming). A breakdown of this potential is as follows: 
on-road: 0.4 GtCO2e; biofuels: 0.15 GtCO2e; modal 
shift: 0.8 GtCO2e; activity reduction: 0.25 GtCO2e. This 
estimate is higher than a previous estimate contained 
in the 4th Assessment Report of the IPCC (IPCC, 2007a). 
But the 2007 assessment underestimated the potential 
for emission reductions in heavy-duty vehicles and in rail 
transport. Also, modal split changes were not included. 
One important opportunity often overlooked for 
reducing energy use and emissions from the transport 
sector is “sustainable” city design. Research has shown 
that a denser settlement pattern can reduce average 
trip distances and make walking, bicycling, and energy-
efficient public transportation a more practical option 
for city residents and visitors. This reduces dependence 
on private vehicles which tend to use more energy 
and produce more emissions per passenger-km than 
alternative modes of mobility.
The total emission reduction potential derived for the 
transportation sector (excluding aviation and shipping) is 
between 1.4 to 2.0 GtCO2e, taking the mitigation potential 
from ICCT with a generic uncertainty range of about 20%.
3.3.4 Options in the buildings sector
Emission reduction options
According to the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report 
(IPCC, 2007b), in the medium term the buildings sector 
could contribute the largest and most cost-effective 
potential to closing the emissions gap compared to 
other sectors. Several studies have since confirmed this 
(IEA, 2008). Since the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, 
the frontiers of building energy efficiency have been 
significantly extended through advances in building 
design and operation, progress in cooling and heating 
technologies, increases in know-how and information 
technology, and enlightened policies for managing energy 
in buildings.
For example, one-quarter of new residential floorspace 
in Austria use less than 15 kWh/m2/yr (Haus der Zukunft, 
2011)22, which is less than one-tenth of the present 
stock average of Central European buildings (Harvey, 
2009, Ürge-Vorsatz et al., 2011).  Thousands of projects 
have demonstrated that all types of existing buildings 
can be retrofitted to consume significantly less energy 
for heating in cold and temperate climates. Such orders 
of magnitude reductions are more challenging in those 
climates that need energy for cooling. However, advances 
in information technology, incorporation of locally-based 
design ideas, renewable energy, and advanced shading/
ventilation do enable low energy buildings in hotter 
climates (e.g. see Filippin & Beascochea, 2007, Schuetze & 
Zhou, 2009, UNEP, 2011).
Very energy efficient buildings, or buildings that 
produce more energy than they consume (energy-plus 
or net energy supplying buildings), are being built at 
an increasing rate around the world. Also increasing in 
number are the mandates, commitments and standards 
21. Including aviation and shipping
22. Austria has highest passive house density in Europe: about 2.5 million m2 (all types of buildings) for 8.4 million Inhabitants while Germany, has 3.4 million 
m2 (Bauer, 2011). There are about 17000 low-energy buildings in Germany and Austria (Bertez, 2009). 
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to construct such buildings (net zero energy or net zero 
carbon) (IEA, 1995, Parker et al., 2001, Iqbal, 2004, 
Christian, 2005, Norton & Christensen, 2006, Mrkonjic, 
2006, US DOE, 2008, Zhu et al., 2009, Wang et al., 2009,  
Miller & Buys, 2010, Ürge-Vorsatz et al., 2011).
Emission reduction potential
For this assessment we compared various recent studies 
of the emission reduction potential from the buildings 
sector (IEA, 2006, IIASA, 2007, IEA, 2008, Laustsen, 
forthcoming, Harvey, 2010, IEA, 2010a, Ürge-Vorsatz 
et al., undated). The scenarios are not always directly 
comparable. Emissions from the buildings sector are 
usually separated into those originating from thermal 
comfort services (heating and cooling), and those coming 
from the use of hot water and electrical appliances. Some 
studies included only part of these emissions. Studies also 
vary in assumptions about the level of decarbonisation 
in electricity production, which is important for indirect 
emissions from the building sector. As for the other 
sectors, some studies provide technical potential, while 
others provide economic potential up to a maximum cost 
level, e.g. 100 US$/tCO2e.
According to most studies, by 2020 mitigation measures 
in heating and cooling can reduce respective final energy 
consumption by approximately 25% (20% – 29%), as 
compared to respective baselines. Accordingly, the 
emission reduction potential from heating and cooling 
(typical baseline energy 80 EJ, average emission factor 
between 70 and 110 kgCO2/GJ) is 1.1 – 2.6 GtCO2.
Stock turnover in buildings is very slow and most 
scenarios assume an acceleration in the construction rate 
of high-performance buildings. In general, it is noted that 
high performance buildings will make a major contribution 
to reducing energy use by 2020, although by 2030 their 
impact could be much bigger. The studies also show 
that current policies risk “locking in” the construction of 
buildings that are much less energy efficient than they 
could be. 
The potential contribution of electrical devices 
(appliances, lighting, ITC and media equipment) to closing 
the gap is more difficult to assess due to the multiplicity 
and diversity of equipment, their short lifetime and 
turnover as well as their dynamic development; in 
addition to the poor worldwide coverage of data on their 
stocks, efficiencies, market turnovers and usages. The 
Global Energy Assessment (see Ürge-Vorsatz et al., 2011) 
however concludes that energy-efficient appliances can 
cut CO2 emissions by 2020 by approximately 25%, or 0.3 
GtCO2e if emission factors are kept constant. 
The emission reduction potential provided above for 
2020 is significantly lower than that provided in the Fourth 
Assessment Report of the IPCC (IPCC, 2007a) (4 GtCO2e in 
2020 for marginal costs up to 100 US$/tCO2e), because of 
the following reasons: 
• Different estimation methods were used: IPCC values 
were aggregated from regional studies, whereas values 
here are from a comparison of global studies. The 
estimates are also based on different assumptions 
of the greenhouse gas emissions avoided per unit of 
energy saved.
• Less time is available to implement reductions: At the 
time of the IPCC report, models were more optimistic 
about short-term emission reductions. Recent studies 
assume mitigation efforts to start a few years later, 
which has a significant effect on the short term 
potential by 2020. But studies are still in agreement that 
substantial reductions can be made in the longer term.
Based on the above, the total emission reduction 
potential derived for the buildings sector is 1.4 – 2.9 
GtCO2e.
3.3.5 Options in the forestry and agriculture sectors 
Emission reduction options
Mitigation options in the forestry sector include 
reducing emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation and enhancing carbon sequestration by 
undertaking afforestation and agroforestry projects, and 
through the sustainable management of new and existing 
forests (Nabuurs et al., 2007). 
Agricultural mitigation measures include changes 
in cropland management and livestocking practices 
that enhance soil carbon as well as reducing non-CO2 
greenhouse gas emissions. These include:
• Reduced tillage 
• Reduced and improved fertilizer management
• Irrigation management 
• Enteric and manure emissions management through 
changes in feed and handling
• Grazing and grassland soil management.
Forestry and agricultural residues or products could 
also be used as a bio-energy feedstock in order to displace 
fossil fuels. However, this option is not included in the 
mitigation potential calculations of this section.
Emission reduction potential
Very few estimates of emissions reductions are available 
for either sector for 2020. Therefore, we adjust the 
more available estimates from 2030 for estimating the 
potentials in 2020. 
The IPCC (Nabuurs et al. 2007) estimates the emission 
reduction potential from forestry to be in the range of 1.3 
to 4.2 GtCO2e in 2030 at carbon prices of up to 100 US$/
tCO2e. A carbon price of 20 US$/tCO2e would achieve 50% 
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of the medium estimate of these emission reductions. 
Nabuurs et al. (2007) base their calculations of the 
economic potential of forestry mitigation options mainly 
on bottom-up assessments which tend to yield lower 
results compared to top-down modelling approaches. 
Estimating the potential for emission reductions from 
agriculture is more complex and more uncertain than it 
is for forestry. The IPCC (Smith et al., 2007) estimates the 
potential range of reducing agricultural emissions to be 
1.5-1.6, 2.5-2.7, and 4.0-4.3 GtCO2e at carbon prices of up 
to 20, 50 and 100 US$/t CO2e. However, there is limited 
evidence and medium agreement for these estimates, 
such that the ± 1 standard deviation range is broad, e.g. 
2.3 to 6.4 GtCO2e for 100 US$/tCO2e. 
Golub et al. (2009) is one of the few studies that 
provides reduction potentials for 2020. Using a top-down 
economy-wide economic framework that accounts for 
global interactions between agriculture and forestry 
(via input, commodity, and international markets), they 
estimate global mitigation potential of approximately 
0.8 GtCO2e for agriculture and 8.5 GtCO2e for forestry 
at about 20 US$/tCO2e, increasing to 1.1 and 9.6 
GtCO2e at 27 US$/tCO2e. Note that the Golub et al. 
agricultural abatement does not include all the soil 
carbon management possibilities noted by Smith et al. 
(2007). Note also, however, that the Golub et al. estimates 
assume an immediate and global GHG price signal and no 
market implementation and transaction costs.
It turns out that top-down global studies that look 
for least-cost opportunities to reduce emissions in all 
sectors tend to find a lower potential for the forestry 
and agriculture sectors, as compared to the numbers 
citied above.  For example,  Nabuurs et al. (2007) suggest 
a central estimate of about 0.7 GtCO2e in 2030 from 
forestry. Smith et al. (2007) estimate reductions of 
methane and nitrous oxide emissions from crops and 
livestock of 0.3–1.5 GtCO2e globally in 2030 with carbon 
prices up to 20 US$/tCO2e, and 0.6–1.9 GtCO2e with 
carbon prices up to 50 US$/tCO2e. 
While the above estimates suggest that there is a large 
but uncertain potential for emission reductions from 
forestry and agriculture by 2020, there are significant 
challenges to realizing it: e.g.,  the uncertainty of emission 
estimates, the lack of policy coordination between various 
institutions, the lack of readiness for implementation, 
the question of net greenhouse gas benefits of various 
measures outside of the sectors, the implications on 
welfare, and the question of public acceptance. 
Based on these findings, the emission reduction 
potential in 2020 derived for forestry is 1.3 – 4.2 GtCO2e, 
which is roughly equal to that estimated by the IPCC 
(2007a) for 2030. The emission reduction potential in 
2020 derived for agriculture is 1.1 – 4.3 GtCO2e, based 
on IPCC values for 2030, but with a smaller value for the 
lower end of the range taken from Golub et al. (2009). 
Note that for forestry this does not include top-down 
estimates, which would increase the forestry range to 8.5 
GtCO2e at 20 US$/tCO2e. 
3.3.6 Options in the waste sector 
Emission reduction options
Methane constitutes some 90% of greenhouse 
emissions from waste. Half of methane emissions are 
from landfill and 40% come from wastewater. The 
remaining (nearly 10%) of greenhouse emissions from 
waste are nitrous oxide (N2O) from wastewater, together 
with a small contribution of CO2 which is emitted when 
plastics and synthetic textiles are incinerated.   
Emission reduction options are widely available and 
have relatively low costs. They include: landfill gas 
recovery and utilization (fully commercial since 1975); 
the design and implementation of landfill “biocovers” 
to optimize methane oxidation; technologies for waste 
incineration and wastewater treatment; as well as 
technologies such as composting, anaerobic digestion 
and reuse/recycling, all of which prevent waste from 
going to land-fills. Each of these can be cost-effectively 
implemented for the dual purposes of improved waste 
management and mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions. 
According to the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report, 
the contribution of the waste sector to greenhouse gas 
emissions was estimated in 2005 to be 1.3 GtCO2e (Bogner 
et al., 2007). Based on business-as-usual case, these 
emissions are projected to rise to about 1.7 GtCO2e in 
2020 (Monni et al., 2006; US EPA, 2011), and most of this 
rise is expected to come from developing countries.
Emission reduction potential
In terms of the costs of abatement, the range of 
estimates is wide. Delhotal et al. (2006) estimate that 
the costs for greenhouse gas abatement from landfill 
gas utilization ranges from a gain of 20 US$/tCO2e to a 
cost of 70 US$/tCO2e. According to the same study, costs 
for landfill gas flaring are 25 US$/tCO2e; 240-270 US$/
tCO2e for composting; 40-430 US$/tCO2e for anaerobic 
digestion; 360 US$/tCO2e for mechanical and biological 
treatment and 270 US$/tCO2e for incineration. Monni 
et al. (2006) have developed baseline and mitigation 
scenarios for the costs of solid waste management.  
delhotal et al. (2006) and Monni et al. (2006) conclude 
that substantial emissions reductions can be achieved at 
low or negative costs (less than 20-30 US$/tCO2e). Both 
studies also assume the same capital costs across all 
regions, but use regionalized labour costs for operations 
and maintenance.  At higher costs, more significant 
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reductions are possible from solid waste management 
(more than 80% from baseline emissions), with most of 
the additional reduction coming from incineration. These 
mitigation measures not only reduce methane but in 
some cases also reduce fossil fuel consumption when the 
recovered methane is used as an energy source. 
Based on the above, the total emission reduction 
potential derived for the waste sector is around 0.8 
GtCO2e. This assumes an 80% reduction below the 
baseline of landfill emissions only (1.0 GtCO2e, Bogner 
et al., 2007). In addition there may be some potential to 
reduce the remaining non-landfill emissions. 
3.3.7 Total emission reduction potential
The emission reduction potentials identified in this 
section are listed in Table 4. As seen from this table, 
the uncertainty range in the sectors is high, leading to 
a high range in the overall estimate. The full range is 16 
± 7.  But assuming that not all uncertainties are at their 
high end simultaneously, we find a smaller range of 16 
± 3, which we consider a more reasonable estimate of 
the uncertainty.
23
 Regardless of the span of uncertainty, 
the mid-range estimate (16 GtCO2e) is large enough to 
bridge the 12 GtCO2e gap in 2020 between BAU emissions 
and the emissions level consistent with the 2°C target.  
Marginal costs of reduction range up to about 50 - 100 
US$/tCO2e. (In the studies reviewed, costs are either 
explicitly specified or implicitly assumed.) 
This figure should not be considered as a stand-alone 
figure, but primarily to confirm that sufficient reduction 
potential is available to close the emissions gap. One of 
the reasons for this caution is that the BAU scenarios are 
not necessarily consistent across the sectors. In addition, 
the definition of what is achievable varies greatly among 
the studies. Nevertheless, most studies take into account 
cost cut-offs of around 50 and 100 US$/tCO2e, as noted 
above. Another qualification is that strong policy efforts 
are necessary to achieve emission reduction potentials, 
although as said below, climate policies and measures 
have already become wide-spread around the world.
The present analysis shows that in many cases not much 
new material is available in addition to the 4th Assessment 
Report of the IPCC (IPCC, 2007a). In other cases, newer 
studies came to different conclusions than the IPCC in 
2007. In particular, the estimates of emission reduction 
potential for the building sector for 2020 presented here 
are lower than previously estimated. Recent studies 
assume mitigation efforts to start a few years later, 
which has a significant effect on the short term potential 
by 2020. But the studies still agree that substantial 
reductions can be made in the long term.
3.4 Conclusions
The mitigation scenarios from the global integrated 
assessment models show that it is technologically and 
economically feasible to bridge the gap in 2020 between 
BAU emissions and emission levels consistent with the 2°C 
target.  They show that the gap can be closed at marginal 
costs of around 38 US$/tCO2e (range 15-85 US$/tCO2e).
An important finding from the review of the 
mitigation scenarios is that intervening in the energy 
system in particular can be a successful strategy for 
reducing emissions. But many different combinations of 
interventions are possible – improving energy efficiency, 
introducing different low-emission energy mixes, and 
reducing non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions. No single 
approach dominates the portfolio of measures identified 
23. It is unlikely that all or several sectors will be simultaneously at the high ends of their uncertainty range.  Therefore, assuming that the uncertainties 
are independent between sectors (which may hold under many cases) we can apply an error propagation rule to calculate the range of the sum of 
the sectors (the square root of the sum of the squares of the range for each sector). This gives a reduced range of ± 3. 
24. See previous footnote
Table 4. Sectoral greenhouse gas emission reduction potentials in 2020 compared to BAU, at costs typically between 50 and 100 US$/
tCO2e, either explicitly or implicitly.
Sector Emission reduction potential in 2020 (GtCO
2
e)
Power sector 2.2 – 3.9
Industry 1.5 – 4.6
Transportation (excluding aviation and shipping) 1.4 – 2.0
Buildings 1.4 – 2.9
Forestry 1.3 – 4.2
Agriculture 1.1 – 4.3
Waste around 0.8
Total (excluding aviation and shipping) 16 ± 3   (Assuming not all uncertainties at their high end 
simultaneously. Full range =  16 ± 7)24
Total (including aviation and shipping from Chapter 4, 
and rounding)
17 ± 3   (Assuming not all uncertainties at their high end 
simultaneously. Full range =  17 ± 7)24
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in these scenarios. Most scenarios show an increase in the 
application of renewable energy sources, but to a widely 
varying extent. Also all scenarios show an additional 
improvement of energy efficiency compared to BAU: 5 
to 11% (with one study indicating a reduction of 18%). 
Most scenarios show an increase in the use of natural gas 
and all scenarios see a decrease of the use of coal. With 
only one exception, CCS does not play a role as emission 
reduction technologies in 2020. 
The sectoral bottom-up analysis confirms the potential 
to close the gap. For all sectors, substantial emission 
reduction potentials are found, with a total in the range 
of 16 ± 3 GtCO2e compared to BAU in 2020. (This sum 
does not include aviation and shipping which is dealt with 
separately in Chapter 4). These potentials can be realized 
at marginal costs of reduction up to about 50-100 US$/
tCO2e and assuming that strong, long-term and sector-
specific policies are in place at global and national levels. 
Delays in taking action will reduce the emission reduction 
potential because less time will be left to implement 
measures.
the good news is that a wide range of policy 
instruments for mitigating greenhouse gas emissions have 
already been adopted and are in use in many different 
sectors and countries throughout the world, and these 
instruments are successful in reducing emissions (e.g., 
Gupta et al., 2007, Billet & Bowerman 2009, WEC, 2010).  
As an overall conclusion, this chapter shows that 
policymakers and stakeholders have a degree of flexibility 
in choosing from a wide variety of options that add up to 
significant total emission reductions. Furthermore, the 
potential for reducing emissions is sufficient enough to 
bridge the gap in 2020 between BAU emissions and the 
emissions consistent with a 2°C/1.5°C temperature target.
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4.1 Introduction 
In The Emissions Gap Report (UNEP, 2010), international 
emissions of CO2 from aviation and shipping were not 
specifically discussed. Emissions from aviation and 
shipping are considered in this chapter since international 
emissions cannot be part of UNFCCC member states’ 
pledges because they are the only sectors not covered 
by developed country’s commitments under the Kyoto 
Protocol. Article 2.2 of the Protocol states that: “The 
Parties included in Annex I shall pursue limitation 
or reductions of emissions of greenhouse gases not 
controlled by the Montreal Protocol from aviation and 
marine bunker fuels, working through the International 
Civil Aviation Organization and the International Maritime 
Organization, respectively.” 
Thus, this chapter addresses them separately. Furthermore:
• Emissions are significant: the combined civil emissions  
from these two sectors in 2005 were approximately 1.6 
gtCO2e and represented 5.4% of total CO2 emissions (from 
fossil fuel usage, cement production and gas flaring25); 
• International emissions dominate total emissions, 
being 62% of total aviation in 2006 (ICAO, 2010a) and 
83% of total shipping emissions in 2007 (Buhaug et al., 
2009);
• Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) used for 
estimating the magnitude of the emissions gap 
(Chapters 2 and 3) include emissions from aviation and 
shipping only as part of a broader transport sector. 
This chapter, however, addresses total global emissions 
from these sectors as opposed to ‘international emissions’ 
Chapter 4:
International Emissions
25.  http://cdiac.ornl.gov/ftp/ndp030/global.1751_2008.ems
26.  This number is slightly larger than that estimated with complex bottom-up inventory models, but such models are known to have a small but significant 
low bias because of incomplete coverage of movements, simplifications regarding routing assumptions and holding patterns, etc. and have been 
factored up by a best estimate for 2006 (ICAO, 2010a), which is unlikely to be significantly different from 2005. 
as defined by the Kyoto Protocol, following the practice of 
IAMs and scientific assessments of impacts. In addition, 
these industries are global in nature; abatement measures 
of an operational or technical nature do not lend 
themselves to differentiation between international and 
domestic emissions.
Apart from the long-term warming caused by CO2 
emissions, both shipping and aviation have significant 
non-CO2 emissions and effects that impact upon radiative 
forcing in both positive (warming) and negative (cooling) 
ways. Overall, aviation’s non-CO2 effects generate 
significant additional warming over shorter timescales 
(Lee et al., 2009). Shipping has short-term, local cooling 
effects but these do not outweigh the longer-term 
warming effect of CO2. These effects are not dealt with 
further here but assessments are provided by Lee et al. 
(2010) for aviation and by Eyring et al. (2010) for shipping.
In the following section, we describe baseline (2005) 
emissions, review available projections of emissions for 
aviation and shipping from the literature, and assess 
the measures available for emission reductions beyond 
BAU developments, as well as policies to drive them. 
Finally, we provide an evaluation of how emissions from 
these sectors could be reduced beyond BAU and how 
implementation of further measures could contribute 
towards closing the gap between pledges and emissions 
consistent with the 2°Ctarget. 
4.2. Baseline emissions and future projections
4.2.1 Baseline emissions for 2005
Aviation. Baseline emissions of CO2 from aviation in 
2005 were 0.74 GtCO2e, using International Energy Agency 
data on kerosene fuel sales, which includes civil and 
military uses  (IEA, 2009). Civil (only) aviation emissions in 
2005 are likely to have been approximately 0.63 GtCO2
26 
(ICAO, 2010a) and were 2.1% of global emissions of CO2.
International Emissions – UNEP BRidgiNg thE EmiSSioNS gAP  41 
Shipping. In contrast to aviation, IEA fuel sales data 
under-report shipping emissions for a number of known 
reasons (see Buhaug et al., 2009). The 2005 best estimate 
used activity-based methods and is taken from the Second 
IMO Greenhouse Gas Study (Buhaug et al., 2009), which 
presented a consensus estimate of 0.96 GtCO2e for 2005, 
some 3.2% of global emissions of CO2.
4.2.2 Emissions projections to 2020 and the outlook for 
2050
A number of near-term ‘forecasts’ and longer-term 
‘scenarios’ for aviation and shipping CO2 emissions 
have been published in recent years. Forecasts consider 
the nearer term (e.g. 2020), and are based upon 
extrapolation of current activity and anticipated growth, 
and incorporate development of known technologies 
and their penetration into the global fleet. Scenarios 
usually consider the longer-term, e.g. 2050, and are often 
developed from broader assumptions on drivers to growth 
(typically global GDP) and longer-term projections of 
technology development.
Aviation. Projections of emissions of CO2 through 
to 2050 are available from the IPCC Special Report on 
“Aviation and the Global Atmosphere” (IPCC, 1999), the 
CONSAVE27 project (Berghof et al., 2005), the QUANTIFY 
project (Owen et al., 2010), and the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (MODTF/FESG, 2009). These 
projections/scenarios deal with the 2020 timeframe in 
different ways, and the data are illustrated in Figure 9. 
Projections of civil aviation emissions range from 0.62 to 
1.16 GtCO2e in 2020.
28
Broadly, these projections vary principally with growth 
assumptions and are variations of BAU scenarios of the 
future. Some individual scenarios include particular 
assumptions regarding technologies, or technology 
targets29, but for the most part, assume no specific policy 
intervention.
Shipping. Projections out to 2020 and beyond have 
been made for the shipping sector by (Eyring et al., 2005), 
the QUANTIFY project (Eide et al., 2007; 2011), and under 
the Second IMO Greenhouse Gas Study (Buhaug et al., 
2009). 
27. The CONSAVE ‘Down To Earth’ scenario was excluded, as the view was taken within MODTF/FESG (2009), which included CONSAVE researchers, that it 
was not plausible because of its strong reliance on behavioral change, which was deemed unlikely.
28. The lower part of the range may contain scenarios with a technology target. Strictly speaking, this makes them more like intervention scenarios than 
business-as-usual scenarios. 
29. See previous footnote.
Figure 9. Emissions of CO2 from aviation from 2000, and projections through to 2050. Data from 2000 to 2009 based on IEA fuel sales 
data. Projections from: MODTF/FESG (2009); QUANTIFY project (based on Owen et al., 2010); IPCC aviation special report (IPCC, 1999); 
CONSAVE project (Berghof et al., 2005). Data are interpolated from the red dot, which represents a best estimate of civil aviation 
emissions in 2006 at 0.63 GtCO2e (see text) to forecast/scenario data points. The solid line (IEA fuel sales) refers to total aviation as 
compared to the rest of the data which refer to only civil aviation. 
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Figure 10. Emissions of CO2 from shipping from 2000 to 2007, and projections through to 2050. Data from 2000 to 2007, IMO Second 
GHG Study (Buhaug et al., 2009). Projections from: IMO Second GHG Study (Buhaug et al., 2009; Eyring et al., 2005); QUANTIFY project 
(Eide et al., 2007). Note that projections from Eyring and Eide have been adjusted upwards to calibrate against the 2007 estimate 
reported by Buhaug et al. (2009). Data are interpolated between 2007 and forecast/scenario data points.
Shipping emission projections also cover a range of 
growth scenarios (using SRES30-type assumptions) and 
envisaged BAU technology and operational improvements, 
resulting in an envelope of potential emissions from 1.11 
to 1.34 GtCO2e in 2020.
Emissions are illustrated over the 2020 and 2050 
timeframes in Figure 10.
4.2.3 Implications of shipping and aviation projections 
for emissions consistent with a 2 °C target
Here we consider the consequences of the range 
of published projections for total global aviation and 
shipping for 2020 (and an outlook to 2050). 
A set of emission pathways consistent with a 2 °C target 
by 2100 is given in Chapter 3. If aviation and shipping 
emissions are combined, and if they progress according 
to any scenario, from the minimum to their maximum31, 
they account for an increasing share of total emissions. 
In 2020, aviation and shipping (combined) emissions are 
expected to range from 1.74 to 2.50 GtCO2e, representing 
4.0 to 5.7% of the median total emissions in 2020. In 
2050, aviation and shipping (combined) emissions are 
expected to range from 2.09 to 6.77 GtCO2e, representing 
10.0 to 32.5% of the median total emissions in 2050.  As 
30.  ‘SRES’ – IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (IPCC, 2000).
31. As defined by endpoint emissions in 2050 – these particular scenarios do not necessarily have the maximum or minimum emissions in 2020.
aviation and shipping emissions increase percentage-
wise, it follows that the sum of emissions from all other 
sectors would have to proportionately decrease to ensure 
that total emissions do not exceed the emissions level 
consistent with a 2°C target. 
4.3 Targets, Goals, Measures, and Abatement 
Potential
4.3.1 Targets and Goals
Aviation. At its 2010 Assembly, the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO) agreed to a voluntary goal of 
a 2% fuel efficiency improvement per year of the global 
fleet until 2020, and a continued aspirational goal of 
2% improvement per year until 2050 (ICAO, 2010b). In 
addition, the International Air Transport Association (IATA) 
has declared CO2 emissions voluntary goals to improve 
fuel efficiency by 1.5% per year to 2020, ‘carbon-neutral 
growth’ from 2020, and a reduction in CO2 emissions by 
50%, relative to 2005 levels, by 2050.
Shipping. Since 2009, the IMO has considered 
whether international shipping should be subject to an 
explicit emission ceiling (cap) in the future, or whether 
a reduction target should be formulated in some other 
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guidelines in accounting for indirect emissions elsewhere, 
i.e. we assume biofuels deliver a 100% reduction in 
aviation (and shipping) CO2 emissions.
The contribution of biofuels has been estimated by CCC 
(2009) to be ≤2% by 2030 under what was described as 
a “likely” scenario, ~3% for an “optimistic” scenario, and 
5% for a “speculative” scenario. Similarly, a 2% market 
penetration of biofuels by 2020 was deemed feasible by 
Novelli (2011).
Other measures. Changes in levels of utilization also 
have the potential to reduce emissions in the aviation 
sector. Such changes may come about as a result of 
policies that seek to influence modal shifts (where 
practicable and environmentally beneficial), or reduce 
demand. In addition, changes to utilization may come 
about through other technological developments such 
as videoconferencing. However, there are not enough 
globally-applicable studies to provide reliable estimates of 
emission reductions from demand-related measures.
Shipping
Operational measures. The most effective operational 
measure for shipping is speed reduction or ‘slow-
steaming’. Other measures include optimization of ballast 
and trim, weather routing, propeller maintenance, and 
increased frequency of hull cleaning.
Speed reductions result in reduced power requirements 
and fuel consumption (Buhaug et al., 2009, Eide et 
al., 2011), there being an approximately quadratic 
relationship between speed and fuel consumption per 
unit distance. Slow-steaming has been adopted voluntarily 
because of increased fuel prices and reduced demand, 
resulting in a ~11% decrease in CO2 emissions from 2008 
for some ship types (Cariou, 2011). Other operational 
measures have lower abatement potentials, estimated to 
be ~ 1-5% (Buhaug et al., 2009, Wang et al., 2010). 
Technological measures. There are numerous 
technological measures that can be implemented to 
improve the fuel efficiency of ships. Wang et al. (2010) 
listed 19 such measures. Eide et al. (2011) listed 25 
measures of which 17 are ‘technological’ and provide 
a detailed analysis of marginal abatement costs. These 
include modifications of the engine; improvements to 
hull form, rudder, and propeller; waste heat recovery, 
and harnessing wind power for propulsion. Not all 
measures are applicable to all ship types, or to ships 
of all sizes and some measures exclude others. Their 
individual abatement potential is generally estimated as 
~1-5% (Buhaug et al., 2009, Wang et al., 2010) although 
a few have theoretical abatement potential of >10%. 
32.  This report only considered single-aisle (e.g. Boeing 737-800, Airbus A320) and small twin-aisle aircraft (e.g. Boeing B777-200ER, Airbus A330). The 
metric was fuel-burn per available tonne km at maximum payload, maximum range conditions over a 2000 reference point. .
way.  A wide variety of views have been expressed by 
IMO member states; some have supported targets, whilst 
others have expressed concerns about their potential 
economic impacts as well as equity issues. No conclusion 
has been reached, although discussions are scheduled to 
continue at future meetings of IMO’s Marine Environment 
Protection Committee (MEPC).
4.3.2 Measures
‘Measures’ here are the technological and operational 
means, or changes in demand, which may reduce 
emissions, for example, through fuel efficiency 
improvements from engine and airframe technology 
design, ship hull design and engine technology 
improvements, or an increased uptake of less carbon-
intensive fuels, etc. 
Aviation
Operational measures. Airspace is subject to 
suboptimal use and interference from weather conditions 
such that improved air traffic management can potentially 
facilitate reduced fuel burn. For instance, by adopting a 
‘continuous descent approach’, where an aircraft’s descent 
starts at an optimal point; or following procedures that 
minimize delays at or around airports. Estimated available 
efficiency improvements range from 3-10% (NARDP, 
2010), although increasing traffic volumes will make it 
harder to fully optimize operations.
Technological measures. Historically, advances in 
engine and airframe technologies have been instrumental 
in improving aircraft fuel efficiency. Technologies that have 
the potential to improve future efficiency include lighter 
materials, adaptable wing trailing-edges, open-rotor and 
geared turbofan engines, and advanced on-board flight 
management systems, although not all realistically apply 
to a 2020 timeframe. Current technologies could improve 
the fuel efficiency of new aircraft types by 19–29% by 
2020, relative to current technology, and 26–48% by 
2030 (IE Report, 2010)32. Changes in engine design alone, 
such as increasing pressure ratio, could force a tradeoff 
between reduced emissions of CO2 versus increased 
emissions of nitrogen oxides (NO
x
) per unit fuel, and 
require additional attention to combustion technology 
design.
Biofuels. Low-carbon alternatives to aviation kerosene 
may include biofuels, although associated indirect 
emissions must be considered. Lifecycle reductions of 
up 80% have been claimed (IATA, 2009); the emissions 
associated with land-use change vary significantly but 
may reduce carbon-savings or even lead to an increase 
(Stratton et al., 2010). This chapter, however, follows IPCC 
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Modifications to engines for increased fuel efficiency can 
bring about increases in NO
x
 per unit fuel, which have 
impacts on air quality and regional pollution, requiring 
additional abatement measures or changes in combustion 
design.
Alternative and low-carbon fuels. Potential alternatives 
to conventional marine fuels include liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) and biofuels (Eyring et al., 2005). LNG has a lower 
carbon to hydrogen ratio than diesel fuels, resulting in 
~15% lower CO2 emissions
33 (Kollamthodi et al., 2008), 
with co-benefits of reduced emissions of NO
x
 and sulphur 
oxides (SO
x
). Most types of biofuels can be used in current 
engines without any need for modifications although 
the relatively low price of marine fuels makes them 
uneconomical (Buhaug et al., 2009). 
4.3.3 Analysis of potential emissions reductions
The previous section provides a rich amount of 
published information about the potential of various 
measures to reduce emissions.  But to obtain an estimate 
of total potential in 2020 it is not advisable to simply add 
up these numbers. This is because the total potential in 
2020 depends on how the aviation and shipping sectors 
develop up to that time and which particular measures 
will be most cost-effective under these future conditions. 
Therefore, in the following sections we analyse results 
from various scenario studies that make assumptions 
about the future development of these sectors and the 
appropriate package of different measures that can be 
feasibly implemented. 
Aviation.  ICAO’s Committee on Aviation Environmental 
Protection (CAEP) has prepared a number of projections 
from 2006 to 2050 (MODTF/FESG, 2009) with three 
levels of growth, and a variety of assumptions regarding 
technology and operational improvements. The 
committee made no assumptions about particular policies 
that would drive the projections but they did specifically 
exclude biofuels. These scenarios illustrate plausible 
emission pathways: Scenario ‘S3’ (see Figure 11) might 
be considered a BAU-type projection delivering “low 
technology and moderate operational” improvements, 
with emissions projected by 2020 to be 0.88, 1.00, 1.03 
GtCO2 (low, central, high projections). Scenario ‘S6’ is 
an “optimistic” technology and operational projection, 
with emissions projected by 2020 to be 0.83, 0.96, 0.98 
GtCO2 (low, central, high projections); i.e. around a 5% CO2 
savings over S3.
Applying the “likely” and “speculative” levels of biofuel 
penetration identified above, we assume an additional 2% 
reduction on the (MODTF/FESG, 2009) S3 scenario and a 
5% reduction on the S6 scenario. The outcomes for these 
particular projections are illustrated in Figure 11 and are 
indicative of plausible emission pathways.  
We can use Figure 11 to estimate emission reduction 
potentials in the aviation sector in 2020. As a first 
33.  After accounting for potential increases in methane emissions, hence ‘CO2e’.
Figure 11. Emissions of CO2 from aviation in 2005, and potential emissions in 2020 according to (MODTF/FESG , 2009) scenario ‘S3’ (low, 
central, high growth) and further reductions possible through additional technological, operational means (scenario ‘S6’), and additional 
reductions from 2% and 5% uptake of low-CO2 biofuels (‘S3-Bio’, ‘S6-Bio’).
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approximation of this potential we subtract the bottom 
and top data in columns 2, 3 and 4 of the figure.  From 
this, we get about 0.1 GtCO2 for emission reduction 
potential in this sector in 2020.
Shipping. Total emissions amounted to 0.96 GtCO2 in 
2005 and are projected to increase to 1.11–1.29 GtCO2 in 
2020 under a BAU scenario that assumes a 12% efficiency 
improvement between 2007 and 2020 (Buhaug et al., 
2009) (see column 2 in Figure 12).  There are many 
measures to improve the fuel efficiency of maritime 
transport (Wang et al. 2010, Eide et al., 2011). If all the 
cost-effective measures listed in Wang et al. (2010) were 
implemented by 2020, emissions are projected to be 
0.93–1.37 GtCO2, depending on the actual abatement 
potential of various measures (the emissions may 
increase, if all the measures together do not add up to 
yield a 12% efficiency improvement) (column 3 in Figure 
12). If all measures evaluated in Wang et al. (2010) were 
implemented, emissions would decrease to 0.73–1.12 
GtCO2 in 2020 (column 4 in Figure 12).  
To obtain a first estimate of the reduction potential 
in the shipping sector, we subtract the minimum value 
of column 4 in figure 12 from the minimum value of 
column 2, and the maximum value of column 4 from the 
maximum value of column 2. In this way we obtain an 
estimate of 0.2–0.4 GtCO2 for emission reduction potential 
in the shipping sector in 2020. 
4.4 Policies
The measures and potential emission reductions 
outlined in the previous sections over and above BAU 
reductions arising by economic pressures can only be 
driven by policies, put in place by governments and 
regulators. In addition, some policies may reduce demand 
by increasing the cost of transport. Here, some of the 
existing and potential policies to drive such measures are 
considered.
Aviation
Operational policies. There are two major initiatives to 
improve air traffic management, Europe’s SESAR (Single 
European Sky ATM Research), which aims to achieve a 
10% emissions reduction per flight by 2020, and the US 
NextGen (Next Generation Air Transportation System), 
which aims to save an average of 1.6 MtCO2 per year to 
2018, or 0.7% of annual US (total) aviation emissions.
Technological policies. ICAO’s CAEP is currently 
developing a CO2 emissions standard for aircraft.
Market-Based Instruments (MBIs). two types of mBis 
attach a price to emissions. These are: charges (such as 
taxes/levies) and cap-and-trade instruments (such as 
tradable emissions rights/allowances/permits).  In the 
aviation sector, only cap-and-trade schemes are currently 
being implemented at an international level: domestic 
flights are included in the New Zealand Emissions Trading 
Figure 12. Emissions of CO2 from shipping in 2005, and potential emissions in 2020 according to IMO scenarios (Buhaug et al., 2009) and 
further reductions possible through additional measures and policies.
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Scheme (ETS); and both domestic and international 
flights are included in the EU ETS, scheduled to begin in  
2012, although the regulation is currently subject to legal 
challenge.
ICAO has debated MBIs as a means to reduce the 
climate impact of aviation since the 1990s, and has 
published Guidance on the Use of Emissions Trading 
(ICAO, 2008) adopted by the 36th ICAO Assembly in 2007. 
It is pursuing further work on MBIs for consideration at 
the 38th Assembly in 2013. 
Shipping
Operational policies. IMO has mandated ships to carry 
a Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP), 
from July 2012. The SEEMP provides operators with a 
framework for the planning, implementation, monitoring, 
and self-evaluation/improvement of operational measures 
appropriate to the ship but will also assist in identifying 
possible technical improvements. Whilst the SEEMP is 
obligatory, the implementation of measures arising from it 
will be voluntary.
Technological policies. IMO introduced a mandatory 
CO2 standard in 2011, known as the Energy Efficiency 
Design Index (EEDI) for major classes of new ship built 
from 2013, representing 72% of emissions from new ships. 
The mandatory value reduces emissions stepwise to 30% 
below the reference level (the average energy efficiency 
index for existing ships of a specific type and size) as of 
2025. In the first four years after coming into force, States 
may waive the requirement for new ships to attain the 
EEDI. IMO estimates that EEDI will deliver savings of 45-50 
Mt CO2 annually by 2020 and 180-240 Mt CO2 annually by 
203034. 
Market-Based Instruments (MBI). A number of MBIs 
have been discussed within IMO, which can be classified 
in three groups (Davidson & Faber, 2010):
• ‘Levy-type’ proposals, such as the International 
Fund for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships, a 
contribution from bunker fuel purchases, to be used 
for acquiring offsets;
• Cap-and-trade proposals; 
• A baseline-and-credit trading scheme, setting a fleet- 
 average fuel efficiency target.
Whilst it is generally agreed that MBIs may be effective 
in reducing emissions in the shipping sector, no decision 
has yet been made on selection or implementation.
4.5 Conclusion
How do aviation and shipping contribute to narrowing 
the emissions gap in 2020? And what is the potential for 
reducing their emissions and contributing to bridging the 
gap? 
Under BAU type scenarios, combined global aviation 
and shipping emissions could add up to 1.7–2.5 GtCO2e in 
2020, according to projections available in the literature, 
where most of the differences are attributable to different 
assumed rates of growth of the sectors. This can be 
compared with the total gap in 2020 between pledged 
emissions and the 2°C target of 6 to 11 GtCO2e (Chapter 3).
As to the potential to reduce emissions, we saw 
previously (Section 4.3.3) that a first estimate of this 
potential in the global aviation sector was about 0.1 
GtCO2e in 2020.  For the global shipping sector this figure 
was approximately 0.2–0.4 GtCO2e.  Therefore, the two 
sectors together could help narrow the gap by around 
0.3–0.5 GtCO2e.  These potential reductions represent 
a significant fraction of projected emissions from these 
sectors under BAU conditions. 
34. http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/HotTopics/GHG/Pages/default.aspx
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